Nietzsche as a Critic of Genealogical Debunking: Making Room for Naturalism without Subversion

Abstract

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticizing genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision.

The value of genealogies for political philosophy

“…Williams argues that Nietzsche's genealogy of morality has the aim of providing an explanation of morality that those who identify with that sort of morality cannot accept. If it is accepted, Nietzsche's genealogy is supposed to render this system of morality reflectively unacceptable, driving its adherents to change their outlook (Williams 2002, 37; but see Queloz and Cueni 2019). By contrast, Williams' genealogy is supposed to show 'why truthfulness has an intrinsic value; why it can be seen as such with a good conscience; why a good conscience is a good thing with which to see it' (Williams 2002, 263).…”

From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy

“…16 For evidence to the effect that the early Nietzsche himself practiced a fairly ahistorical form of pragmatic genealogy, see Queloz (2017, Manuscript). For a discussion of the role of history in Nietzsche's mature thought which argues that Nietzsche was a critic rather than an advocate of genealogical debunking, see Queloz and Cueni (2019).…”

“…1 In Queloz (2018b), I offer a reconstruction of Williams's genealogy explaining how it can coherently involve itself in history while remaining a pragmatic genealogy starting out from a fictional state of nature. For a reconstruction of Craig's genealogy as a pragmatic genealogy, see Queloz (2019). For a disambiguation of the notion of the point of conceptual practices, see Queloz (Forthcoming).…”

Choosing Values? Williams Contra Nietzsche

“…' (1999a: 246). For explorations of Williams's debts to (or parallels with) Nietzsche, see Clark (2015a), Katsafanas (2016), Leiter (manuscript), Prescott-Couch (2014), Queloz and Cueni (2019), Queloz (2017, forthcoming-a; forthcoming-b: ch. 7), and Robertson and Owen (2013).…”

“…For an account of the criterion as being less about the effects of values than about the ideals they express, seeHuddleston (2015Huddleston ( , 2019). 6 Another strand is his critique of ascetic conceptions of values, which I have argued elsewhere is logically prior to the revaluation of values; seeQueloz and Cueni (2019).…”