“…So, it is the ascetic ideal that allows the bad conscience to interpret human indebtedness as a compromising of our worth (i.e., a guiltiness). Clark () agrees and explains the point in this way: The material concept of debt was transformed into the fully moral concept of guilt when the divine being to whom the debt was owed was conceived nonnaturalistically or ascetically, as a repudiation of the value of natural human existence. What transforms debt into guilt – makes it unpayable and a matter of our worth as persons – is the ascetic ideal (Clark, : 30).…”
Section: Indebtedness and Delinquent Indebtednessmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…The material concept of debt was transformed into the fully moral concept of guilt when the divine being to whom the debt was owed was conceived nonnaturalistically or ascetically, as a repudiation of the value of natural human existence. What transforms debt into guilt – makes it unpayable and a matter of our worth as persons – is the ascetic ideal (Clark, : 30).…”
Section: Indebtedness and Delinquent Indebtednessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The primary studies I have in mind are Clark () and Clark (), Ridley () and Ridley (), May (), Risse () and Risse (), Leiter (), Janaway (), Reginster (), and Zamosc ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See Ridley (: 34); Risse (: 65); Clark (: 29‐30; 2001: 116‐7); Leiter (: 240); and Zamosc (: 111). Janaway and Reginster are the primary dissenters on this.…”
In this paper, I offer a new way of reading Nietzsche's second essay in On the Genealogy of Morality. At the heart of my account is the claim that Nietzsche is primarily interested in a persistent or existential form of guilt in this essay and only concerned with locally reactive cases of guilt as a function of this deeper phenomenon. I argue that, for Nietzsche, this persistent form of guilt develops out of a deep feeling of indebtedness or owing that accompanies a fearful sense of dependency on the gods. When this sense of dependent indebtedness mixes with bad conscience, which arises through the shift from prehistoric tribes to state‐like communities, it becomes a moral problem; vast numbers of “slaves and serfs” (GM II.20) start to feel like they are not sufficiently honoring their dependent relationship with the gods. It is this feeling of persistent guilt that Nietzsche thinks metastasizes into Christian guilt.
“…So, it is the ascetic ideal that allows the bad conscience to interpret human indebtedness as a compromising of our worth (i.e., a guiltiness). Clark () agrees and explains the point in this way: The material concept of debt was transformed into the fully moral concept of guilt when the divine being to whom the debt was owed was conceived nonnaturalistically or ascetically, as a repudiation of the value of natural human existence. What transforms debt into guilt – makes it unpayable and a matter of our worth as persons – is the ascetic ideal (Clark, : 30).…”
Section: Indebtedness and Delinquent Indebtednessmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…The material concept of debt was transformed into the fully moral concept of guilt when the divine being to whom the debt was owed was conceived nonnaturalistically or ascetically, as a repudiation of the value of natural human existence. What transforms debt into guilt – makes it unpayable and a matter of our worth as persons – is the ascetic ideal (Clark, : 30).…”
Section: Indebtedness and Delinquent Indebtednessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The primary studies I have in mind are Clark () and Clark (), Ridley () and Ridley (), May (), Risse () and Risse (), Leiter (), Janaway (), Reginster (), and Zamosc ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…See Ridley (: 34); Risse (: 65); Clark (: 29‐30; 2001: 116‐7); Leiter (: 240); and Zamosc (: 111). Janaway and Reginster are the primary dissenters on this.…”
In this paper, I offer a new way of reading Nietzsche's second essay in On the Genealogy of Morality. At the heart of my account is the claim that Nietzsche is primarily interested in a persistent or existential form of guilt in this essay and only concerned with locally reactive cases of guilt as a function of this deeper phenomenon. I argue that, for Nietzsche, this persistent form of guilt develops out of a deep feeling of indebtedness or owing that accompanies a fearful sense of dependency on the gods. When this sense of dependent indebtedness mixes with bad conscience, which arises through the shift from prehistoric tribes to state‐like communities, it becomes a moral problem; vast numbers of “slaves and serfs” (GM II.20) start to feel like they are not sufficiently honoring their dependent relationship with the gods. It is this feeling of persistent guilt that Nietzsche thinks metastasizes into Christian guilt.
“…Maudemarie Clark describes this well: “Nietzsche suggests that concepts influenced by history are like ropes held together by the intertwining of strands, rather than by a single strand running through the whole thing. To analyze such concepts is not to find necessary and sufficient conditions for their use but to disentangle the various strands that may have become so tightly woven together by the process of historical development that they seem inseparable” (, 22).…”
On offer here is a tradition‐neutral way of understanding the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy of music. The distinction is drawn in terms of methodology, rather than content, by identifying contrasting methodological tendencies of each tradition—initial maneuvers that frame an investigation, which are related to one another insofar as they involve, or do not involve, two kinds of methodological detachment. These maneuvers are extracted through a consideration of contrasting pairs of examples. The pairs consist of an analytic and a continental account of a core issue in the philosophy of music. The issues considered are musical experience, musical ontology, and the relationship between music and the emotions. The philosophers considered are Roger Scruton and Pierre Bourdieu, Jerrold Levinson and Lydia Goehr, Peter Kivy, and Andrew Bowie.
This paper analyses the connection between Nietzsche's early employment of the genealogical method and contemporary neo-pragmatism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by viewing Nietzsche's writings in the light of neo-pragmatist ideas and reconstructing his approach to justice as a pragmatic genealogy, it seeks to bring out an under-appreciated aspect of his genealogical method which illustrates how genealogy can be used to vindicate rather than to subvert and accounts for Nietzsche's lack of historical references. On the other hand, by highlighting what Nietzsche has to offer neo-pragmatism, it seeks to contribute to neo-pragmatism's conception of genealogy. The paper argues that Nietzsche and the neo-pragmatists share a naturalistic concern and a pragmatist strategy in responding to it. The paper then shows that Nietzsche avoids a reductive form of functionalism by introducing a temporal axis, but that this axis should be understood as a developmental model rather than as historical time. This explains Nietzsche's failure to engage with history. The paper concludes that pragmatic genealogy can claim a genuinely Nietzschean pedigree.
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