No bare particulars

Abstract

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory-bare particularism-is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic-and, I shall argue, false-crowding consequence.

Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism

“…Someone might also attack a distinction between the different senses of possession of properties proposed: the distinction between instantiating as having properties, on the one hand, and instantiating as bearing properties, on the other. This critique is motivated by the so-called, overpopulation objection to bare particular theory (Bailey 2012;Wildman 2015). According to Bailey, the distinction between bearing and having properties is illusory: if α has F and B bears F, then B is F in the same sense that α is F. As a result, there are two distinct entities at the same time and place that have the same properties but are not identical.…”

Yes: Bare Particulars!

“…If a recent objection to 'the Bare Particular Theory' -Andrew Bailey's (2012) 'New Objection' -succeeds then they cannot. I will take this objection as my starting point: it is set out just below.…”

Tropes As Character-Grounders

“…Bailey [2012] raises a character-duplication problem for bare particulars; seePickavance [2014] for a reply. Another example is the 'Two Many Thinkers' problem for psychological approaches to personal identity.…”