2017
DOI: 10.1111/polp.12216
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No Contractual Obligation to Improve Education: School Boards and Their Superintendents

Abstract: Since the passage of No Child Left Behind, public schools have felt pressure to emphasize equitable academic outcomes. We investigate whether contracts agreed to by school boards and the superintendents they employ include academic and equity criteria to judge the performance of superintendents. Data come from the universe of 2013‐14 school superintendent contracts in North Carolina. Only nine of the 115 contracts include academic goals of any kind, and none include equity‐related criteria. Similarly, the univ… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
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“…The evidence from some high-profile cases is consistent with the notion that mayoral control causes conflict between reform-oriented superintendents and traditional education actors such as school board members, teacher unions, and parent associations (Beck, 2003;Lofton, 2010;Maranto et al, 2017). This was the case in Washington, D.C., where the appointed superintendent, Michelle Rhee, decided to fire central office staff and implement a significant teacher compensation reform without broad community agreement 1 (Rhee, 2014;Wong, 2011).…”
Section: Mayoral Control In the United States And Japansupporting
confidence: 58%
“…The evidence from some high-profile cases is consistent with the notion that mayoral control causes conflict between reform-oriented superintendents and traditional education actors such as school board members, teacher unions, and parent associations (Beck, 2003;Lofton, 2010;Maranto et al, 2017). This was the case in Washington, D.C., where the appointed superintendent, Michelle Rhee, decided to fire central office staff and implement a significant teacher compensation reform without broad community agreement 1 (Rhee, 2014;Wong, 2011).…”
Section: Mayoral Control In the United States And Japansupporting
confidence: 58%
“…The success of these contracts in producing the intended outcomes often depends in part on the clarity and intentionality of the signal sent between principal and agent (Baker, 1992; Holmström, 1979; Moe, 1984). For instance, Maranto et al (2017) investigate superintendent contracts with school boards in North Carolina and find that very few contracts specify student performance targets for superintendents. These authors conclude that the lack of specificity around these expectations mean that school boards are unlikely to drive student achievement results through their management of superintendents.…”
Section: Conceptual Framework: Charter Authorizing As Contractingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Management comes next, essentially tied with standardized test scores. Similarly, Robert Maranto, Julie Trivitt, Malachi Nichols, and Angela Watson (2017) found that superintendent contracts seldom mention academic duties or goals, focusing instead on general management duties or formal job requirements such as degrees and work hours. In short, student academic learning has little effect on school board evaluations of superintendents.…”
Section: Work Histories School Boards and Career Outlooksmentioning
confidence: 99%