No deep disagreement for new relativists

Francén, Ragnar

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9414-6

Cited by 27 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…López de Sa 2009, 3-5. See also Richard 2004;Stojanovic 2007, 699-703;von Fintel and Gillies 2008;and Francén 2010). If we pay close attention to the two-dimensional framework claimed by Kaplan, Lewis and others, the truth-value of an utterance can be contextually variable.…”

Section: Some Contextualist Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Disagreement and the speaker’s point of view

Colomina-Almiñana

2015

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This article defends an intentionalist solution to cases of disagreement. Unlike conventionalist approaches, the paper shows that the truth-value of some sentences is shifted and relative to the concrete way the assertion is made. Unlike relativist accounts, it argues that cases of subjective meaning are just apparent, and really express normative content as included in embedded sentences. The paper advocates for a solution based on what I call the speaker's point of view, which understands disagreement as expressing the speaker's perspective in conversation about a particular matter without constraining the truth-value of the sentences of our natural language. Consequently, the speaker's utterance is a speech act necessarily related to the interlocutor's utterance, which is another speech act, since only by integrating the level of the communicative function into a dialogic interaction the real meaning of the utterances can completely show up.

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Section: Some Contextualist Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Disagreement and the speaker’s point of view

Colomina-Almiñana

2015

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“…The answer is yes. As noticed by Francén (2010), subject A might very well believe that subject B's standard of taste is not such that the proposition that ice cream is tasty is true at it. Therefore, A might very well acknowledge that B is not making any error by following the norm she is subject to, namely the norm of believing what is true relative to her own standards of evaluation.…”

Section: Assessing Epmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists

Palmira

2014

Acta Anal

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In recent work ("Disagreement, relativism, and doxastic revision", 2014, Erkenntnis), J. Adam Carter argues that truth-relativism should be compatible with the so-called conformist response to peer disagreement about taste to the effect that subjects should revise their opinions. However, Carter claims that truth-relativism cannot make sense of this response since it cannot make sense of the idea that when two subjects are recognised as epistemic peers, they should acknowledge that they are equally likely to be right about the targeted issue. The main aim of this paper is a modest one: to argue that truth-relativists should not be worried about their alleged incompatibility with conformism for they should be non-conformists.Keywords Peer disagreement . Truth-relativism . Rationality . Conformism . Non-conformism Truth-Relativism and the Epistemology of DisagreementIn his 2014 paper "Disagreement, relativism, and doxastic revision" (Erkenntnis, vol. 79), J. Adam Carter advances a novel and interesting approach to current semantic and epistemological debates about disagreement by investigating how a truth-relativist accounts of evaluative discourses, such as taste and aesthetics, manages to deal with the problem of epistemic peer disagreement.Carter claims that peer disagreement about evaluative matters typically motivates a conformist response to the effect that, after the discovery of disagreement, subjects should revise their doxastic attitudes:If A and B can disagree about p, one way they can disagree about p is as recognised epistemic peers, and then the question arises: is doxastic revision Acta Anal

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“…However, there has been some controversy over whether the relativist can underwrite the disagreement data; see e.g. Francén (2009). 8 Kölbel (2004, pp.…”

Section: Two Challenges From Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement

Baker

2010

Philos Stud

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In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as ''beautiful.'' Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism-individualized indexical contextualism-I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both (a) satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement-data and (b) is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic.

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No deep disagreement for new relativists

Cited by 27 publications

References 21 publications

Disagreement and the speaker’s point of view

Disagreement and the speaker’s point of view

Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists

Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement

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