No Exception for Belief

Rinard, Susanna

doi:10.1002/9781119420828.ch4

Cited by 32 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Other writers, like Fantl and McGrath [21], construe evidentialism as the view that what is rationally permissible for an agent to believe depends solely on her evidence, and not on any pragmatic factors. Finally, some writers like Rinard [60] also use 'evidentialism' to pick out the view that there are no practical reasons for belief. My definition of 'evidentialism' is compatible with the last two of these views, but entails none of them: it is neutral on whether epistemic rationality or justification has a pragmatic component, and on whether there might be practical reasons for holding certain beliefs.…”

Section: Motivation Ii: the Principle Of Total Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Das¹

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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Recently, several epistemologists have defended an attractive principle of epistemic rationality, which we shall callUr-Prior Conditionalization. In this essay, I ask whether we can justify this principle by appealing to the epistemic goal of accuracy. I argue that any such accuracy-based argument will be in tension withEvidence Externalism, i.e., the view that agent’s evidence may entail nontrivial propositions about the external world. This is because any such argument will crucially require the assumption that, independently of all empirical evidence, it is rational for an agent to be certain that her evidence will always include truths, and that she will always have perfect introspective access to her own evidence. This assumption is incompatible withEvidence Externalism. I go on to suggest that even if we don’t acceptEvidence Externalism, the prospects for any accuracy-based justification forUr-Prior Conditionalizationare bleak.

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Section: Motivation Ii: the Principle Of Total Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Das¹

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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“…If it will facilitate my sense of superiority to you to perceive you as dangerous, that does not make my prior belief that you are dangerous epistemically rational, even if believing that facilitates my goals. Some philosophers try to assimilate epistemic rationality to practical rationality, but they acknowledge that they have a lot of explaining to do (Rinard ).…”

Section: Reply To Chirimuutamentioning

confidence: 99%

Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”

Beck

Chirimuuta

Rosenhagen

et al. 2018

Philosophical Books

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“…Pragmatists include (among many others) RichardFoley (1987), GilbertHarman (1999), WilliamJames (1979), BerislavMarusic (2015), Miriam McCormick(2015), DavidPapineau (2013), RobertPasnau (2015), AndrewReisner (2009), Susanna Rinard (2017), and Stephen Stich (1990.…”

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Believing for Practical Reasons

Rinard

2018

Nous

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Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can't be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it's possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here.

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No Exception for Belief

Cited by 32 publications

References 27 publications

Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”

Believing for Practical Reasons

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