No harm in being self-corrective: Self-criticism and reform intentions increase researchers’ epistemic trustworthiness and credibility in the eyes of the public

Abstract

Science should be self-correcting. However, researchers often hesitate to admit errors and to adopt reforms in their own work. In two studies (overall N = 702), we test whether scientific self-criticism and reform intentions expressed by researchers damage or rather improve their reputation in the eyes of the public (i.e. perceivers). Across both studies, such self-correction (compared to no self-correction) increases perceivers’ epistemic trustworthiness ascriptions, credibility perceptions, and willingness to further engage with science. Study 2 revealed that these effects were largely driven by the no self-criticism condition. In addition, researchers’ commitment to implementing reforms had positive effects and rejecting reforms had negative effects on perceptions, irrespective of the extent of these reforms. These findings suggest that researchers’ fear that self-criticism and expressing reform intentions may damage their reputation may be unfounded.

Attitudes Towards Science During the Covid-19 Pandemic

“…This would predict that framing scientific uncertainty in terms of high complexity could have detrimental effects, whereas framing uncertainty as part of a productive scientific controversy could have positive effects on the attitude toward science. In line with this reasoning, prior research found that when researchers reacted to uncertainty and controversy with productive self-correction, the public evaluated this positively (Altenmüller et al, 2021;Ebersole et al, 2016). The reflection of scientific uncertainty in both clusters may also explain some of the observed positive relations between nodes from the pro-and the anti-science cluster.…”

“…In particular, nodes regarding the affective component of the attitude towards science may be missing, as this component was measured with only two trust-related nodes. Moreover, trust is not necessarily solely an affective reaction, as many scholars argue that trust has both affective and cognitive components (Altenmüller et al, 2021;Hendriks et al, 2015;Johnson & Grayson, 2005). Thus, future research should add additional affective nodes into the network, such as perceptions of scientists' warmth (Fiske & Dupree, 2014) or specific emotions felt toward science and scientists (Furman, 2020), to ensure that the attitude network is estimated correctly.…”

“…However, conceptualising public attitudes towards science as a psychological network may be especially promising because psychological networks allow the visualisation and interpretation of even very complex attitude structures (Dalege et al, 2016). Due to the inherent complexity of science, it seems indeed likely that the attitude towards science is highly complex and consists of various evaluative reactions, including aspects such as scientific knowledge, scientific methodology, and the scientific community itself (e.g., Altenmüller et al, 2021;Bromme et al, 2010;Wingen et al, 2020). For example, regarding the affective component, the attitude towards science may include ratings of scientists' warmth (Fiske & Dupree, 2014) or specific emotions felt towards science or scientists (Furman, 2020).…”

“…Moreover, trust in science is likely an especially important affective evaluation because people often have to rely on trust when engaging with science, as science is inherently complex and often inaccessible for non-scientists (Bromme & Goldman, 2014;Hendriks et al, 2016). It is, however, important to note that trust in science is probably not purely affective and relates also to cognitive beliefs about scientists' competence (Altenmüller et al, 2021;Hendriks et al, 2015). The cognitive component of attitudes towards science may further include beliefs about the value of science for solving problems (Broomell & Kane, 2017;Hilgard & Jamieson, 2017), evaluations of scientific uncertainty and complexity (Rabinovich & Morton, 2012;van der Bles et al, 2019), or even views about rather specific scientific methods and controversies, such as replicability or publication modes (Hendriks et al, 2020;Wingen et al, 2022).…”

Psychology and Law, Meet Open Science

“…Archive your deidentified data file, code, and results on a public repository and be willing to extend your work by replicating and collaborating with others. Be open about intentions to reform and admit errors-doing so can even increase public perceptions of researcher trustworthiness and credibility (Altenmüller et al, 2021).…”