No Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief

Steglich‐Petersen, Asbjørn

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.455.x

Cited by 120 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A somewhat less radical option would be to interpret rational requirements and other putatively normative principles applying to intentional states as instrumental principles, expressing descriptive statements on how to satisfy one's ends. In previous work, I have defended such an account of the rational requirements and correctness conditions for belief (Steglich-Petersen 2006 The third consideration is of a methodological nature. I take it to be a sound methodological principle that if it is a highly confirmed law that all Fs are G, and we encounter an x which is apparently F but not G, then we have prima facie reason to doubt that x is really an F, despite appearances.…”

Section: Reply To Zangwillmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Steglich‐Petersen

2011

Dialogue

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Reply To Zangwillmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Steglich‐Petersen

2011

Dialogue

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…I only use truth as my example in this paper for simplicity and because it is the most popular candidate. See for instance Williams (1973), Railton (1994Railton ( , 1997, Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Burge (2003), Millar (2004), Gibbard (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006), Vahid (2006, Whiting (2010), and Littlejohn (2012. Knowledge is the most popular alternative.…”

Section: Epistemic Constitutivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Côté-Bouchard

2016

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic normativity.

show abstract

“…But agents can of course have radically idiosyncratic ends, goals, 1 For a nice articulation of this question in the practical domain, see Dreier (2015). 2 Kornblith (1993Kornblith ( , 2002, Stitch (1990), Papineau (1999Papineau ( , 2009, Steglich-Petersen (2006, Grimm (2008Grimm ( , 2009 and Street (2009Street ( , 2008. 3 Kelly (2003Kelly ( , 2007, Wedgwood (2007) and Parfit (2011). and interests.…”

Section: Introduction: Instrumentalism Intrinsicalism and A Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Sharadin

2016

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Epistemic instrumentalists face a puzzle. In brief, the puzzle is that if the reason there is to believe in accord with the evidence depends, as the instrumentalist says it does, on agents' idiosyncratic interests, then there is no reason to expect that this reason is universal. Here, I identify and explain two strategies instrumentalists have used to try and solve this puzzle. I then argue that we should find these strategies wanting. Faced with the failure of these strategies, I articulate a heretofore neglected solution on behalf of instrumentalism.

show abstract

No Norm Needed: on the Aim of Belief

Cited by 120 publications

References 7 publications

Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Against Essential Mental Normativity Again

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About