Safety, Reliability and Risk Analysis 2013
DOI: 10.1201/b15938-244
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No swans in sight—analyzing the resilience in Norwegian water passenger transport

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Cited by 5 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…They value their autonomy and thus take a lot of responsibility, maybe beyond what management explicitly has stated or expected. This is also described in Norwegian coastal passenger transport (Aalberg andBye, 2017, Størkersen andJohansen, 2014) and cargo transport and the aquaculture industry (Størkersen, 2012). According to earlier research, management's safety commitment is important for the safety on the vessels (Lappalainen, 2016, Bhattacharya, 2012.…”
Section: Maritime Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaftmentioning
confidence: 88%
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“…They value their autonomy and thus take a lot of responsibility, maybe beyond what management explicitly has stated or expected. This is also described in Norwegian coastal passenger transport (Aalberg andBye, 2017, Størkersen andJohansen, 2014) and cargo transport and the aquaculture industry (Størkersen, 2012). According to earlier research, management's safety commitment is important for the safety on the vessels (Lappalainen, 2016, Bhattacharya, 2012.…”
Section: Maritime Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaftmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…This makes procedures too numerous, detailed, and distanced from actual operations (Lappalainen, 2016, Bhattacharya, 2012. For some situations there are more than one procedure, or too few crewmembers to comply (Aalberg andBye, 2017, Størkersen andJohansen, 2014). Seafarers are also required to perform documentation "essentially outside their primary functions of ensuring safe and efficient sailing" (Silos et al, 2012).…”
Section: Research About Conflicting Conditionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regulation motivates maritime organizations to take safety precautions (Kongsvik et al, submitted for publication; Knapp and Van de Velden, 2011), but the trend toward auditability and accountability as safety measures can marginalize useful safety practices and improvisation abilities Dekker, 2014;Størkersen and Johansen, 2014;Bieder and Bourrier, 2013). In spite of such secondary effects, research shows this type of regulation continues due to lack of resources: maritime deaths in poor sectors are not given public attention, let alone funding for regulatory development (Lindøe et al, 2011).…”
Section: The Regulator's Lotmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…That would assist the core ideas of a high-reliability organization, such as mindfulness, commonly known as resilience engineering (Kee et al, 2017). Størkersen, in a study, identified that organizations, because of the tightness of schedules and competitiveness, display limited and low resilience to prevent unwanted events; therefore, emergency preparedness plans are difficult to practice during operations, especially fire drills, and are also affected due to short manning (Størkersen & Johansen, 2013). The Eastern Star † incident in China further accentuates the severe role of resilience, revealing crew underestimation of storm severity, delayed navigation stoppage, lax shipbuilding inspections, and profit-driven actions affecting safety (Wang et al, 2019).…”
Section: Resiliencementioning
confidence: 99%