No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy

Abstract

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either (a) be an account of well-being, (b) provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or (c) avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy.

A Reformed Division of Labor for the Science of Well-Being

“…think of the issue whether welfare is enhanced by the satisfaction of morally questionable preferences), leading proponents of CAs ground their proposals on philosophical theories of well-being rather than on a reflective equilibrium between philosophical theories and empirical findings, as CAs would prescribe (e.g. Hersch, 2020b; also Alexandrova, 2017a, p. xxxvii, claiming that ‘no choice of a given construct of well-being is intelligent and justified without a theory underpinning it, and building such theories is a distinctly philosophical exercise’). This, in turn, makes it pressing for CAs’ proponents to explicate how exactly the CAs they advocate differ from and improve on the TBAs they criticize and call to replace.…”

“…8 8 A critic of RDL may object that some proponents of CAs acknowledge that the agreement between the best available philosophical theories often enables researchers to significantly constrain the set of plausible constructs and measures of well-being and reach agreement regarding several policies' welfare evaluations (e.g. Hersch, 2020b). This acknowledgement, however, stands in tension with the same authors' insistence that 'we cannot independently answer the question of "what is well-being?"…”

“… 8 A critic of RDL may object that some proponents of CAs acknowledge that the agreement between the best available philosophical theories often enables researchers to significantly constrain the set of plausible constructs and measures of well-being and reach agreement regarding several policies’ welfare evaluations (e.g. Hersch, 2020b). This acknowledgement, however, stands in tension with the same authors’ insistence that ‘we cannot independently answer the question of “what is well-being?” and the question of “what counts as a measurement of well-being?” [and that] to make progress in the science of well-being [we have to] coordinate between well-being theories and well-being measures’ (Hersch, 2020a, p. 2 and p. 7).…”

Sustainable Well-Being in Israel

“…being itself, nevertheless constitute outcomes or clear evidence of its existence. Focusing on these markers can therefore suffice for such practical purposes as well-being measurement (Hersch, 2020;Taylor, 2015). Furthermore, assessing well-being sustainability allows one to avoid this challenge, to some degree.…”

Normative Models and Their Success

“… 1 Philosophers have recently started to ask how scientific tools are apt to provide us with normative guidance (see, for instance, Alexandrova 2018; Hersch 2020). Yet, this debate has, so far, not focused on normative models. …”