The Ordinary Language Movement in twentieth-century philosophy is typically associated with the work of the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and, to some extent, Strawson. 1 The movement was massively influential, but today it's unusual to find philosophers self-ascribing that label. In some circles, the label "ordinary language philosophy" is slightly derogatory-an indication that the work is somewhat outdated and methodologically flawed. In this essay, we want to counteract that attitude. Some of the core ideas behind the movement are and should be central to work done in all parts of philosophy. We try to articulate how and why ordinary concepts are central to much of philosophy (in a way that they are not to, say, physics).
1The seminal texts in the tradition include Austin 1962, some of Ryle's papers (1971), and perhaps Strawson's work on "descriptive" metaphysics (1959). For an overview, see Parker-Ryan 2012. Relevant also is the so-called contemporary ordinary language philosophy (Hansen 2014(Hansen , 2020. This includes work in experimental philosophy, but also mainstream subdisciplines of contemporary philosophy, including ones discussed below. One way to view the present essay is as exploring the foundations of contemporary ordinary language philosophy.