Using the British New Earnings Survey Panel Data for 1975-2001, the authors esti mate the wage cyclicality (the degree to which wage levels rise and fall with economic upturns and downturns) of three groups: job stayers, within-company job movers, and between-companyjob movers. Wages of internal movers, they find, were slightly more procyclical, and wages of external movers considerably more procyclical, than those of stayers. The greater cyclicality of movers' wages is particularly apparent for private sector workers and persons not covered by collective agreements. Neverthe less, because job stayers comprised about 90% of all observations in this large sample of British workers, the procyclicality of their wages was the predominant determinant of the overall procyclical pattern found across all groups. Thus, the analysis does not support the implication of some rigid wage models that employers use job title changes to adjust wages to the business cycle. Increased flexibility is a prime objective of government labor market policy in many economies. Against a recent back ground of relatively sluggish economic per formance, it has been especially emphasized by policy-makers of member countries within the European Union. Central to the goal of flexibility has been the attainment of overall wage cyclically, since the closeness of the tie between wages and market conditions determines the extent to which adverse shocks eventuate in wage adjustments rather than job losses. Total wage adjustment de rives from three primary sources: the wage changes of workers (a) within single jobs, (b) moving between jobs within the same company, and (c) moving between different companies. Evidence from panel microdata shows that real wage changes of between-company movers are more procyclical than wages of within-company stayers (Bils 1985; Shin 1994). Also, real wages of alljob movers?that is, within-and between-companyjob movers combined?have been found to be more procyclical than wages of job stayers (Hart 2006). However, these studies fall short of providing detailed evidence concerning the process of internal real wage cyclicality. Is within-company wage cyclicality mainly the result of internal promotions and demo tions, with wage stickiness prevailing within