Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes

Abstract

We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a vote of party members, and nominations by a spending competition among potential candidates. We show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competition than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can result via any of these processes. When voters (and potential nominees) are free to switch political parties, then median outcomes ensue when nominations are decided by a vote but not when nominations are decided by spending competition.Nominations are a critical part of many elections. While the modeling of elections is extensive, there are no systematic studies of how the specifics of the nomination process affect election outcomes. In this paper we develop and analyze three simple models of prominent nomination processes, all within the same basic election setting. We show that the differences in nomination process can have a large impact on the election outcome.In particular, we consider a setting in which two competing political parties simultaneously nominate candidates (out of their respective memberships) for an election. If elected, a candidate chooses his or her most preferred policy from a one-dimensional set of potential policies. All voters (who compose the parties and are thus also the potential MS

Candidate and Party Strategies in Two‐Stage Elections Beginning with a Primary

“…In a separate paper, Serra (2006b) determines equilibrium policy strategies for primary candidates, but in a model different from ours-one that assumes polarization of parties and uncertainty about voter preferences but does not employ our key assumption of uncertainty about the quality of potential contenders' campaigns. Jackson, Mathevet, and Mattes (2007) determine an equilibrium defined by specifying that in each party the party's nominee cannot be beaten in a head-to-head vote with some other potential nominee, given the other party's nomination. In contrast to our assumptions, they do not permit candidates to move their policy positions nor do they assume uncertainty about campaign quality.…”

Electoral Selection with Parties and Primaries

“…Our work diverges from previous models of primaries which have focused on extensions of the Downsian framework (e.g., Aranson and Ordeshook 1972; Coleman 1971, 1972; Owen and Grofman 2006). Closer to our work are Caillaud and Tirole (1999), Jackson, Mathevet, and Mattes (2007), Adams and Merrill (2008), Castanheira, Crutzen, and Sahuguet (2010), and Serra (2011), who study the incentives of parties to introduce democratic governance. While none of these articles arrive at the same predictions as those here, Serra’s work perhaps most closely complements ours.…”

“…7 7 In Jackson, Mathevet, and Mattes (2007) candidates are distinguished only by ideology, while in Castanheira et al (2010) they are distinguished only by valence. …”

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“…In a seminal paper by Snyder & Ting (2002) have focused exclusively on either the quality/valence dimension or the policy dimension. Quality is the center of attention in Mattozzi & Merlo (2007, and Snyder & Ting (2011), while Cadigan & Janeba (2002) and Jackson et al (2007) are concerned with policy. 2 Contributions that features both quality and policy are Adams & Merrill (2008) and Serra (2011).…”