Non-compliance notifications and taxpayer strategic behavior: evidence from Ecuador

Sánchez, Gonzalo E.

doi:10.1007/s10797-021-09677-y

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…While, in respect of the pre-audit effect, there is a considerable body of evidence generally supportive of the aforementioned predictions of the AS model (e.g., Slemrod et al, 2001;Fellner et al, 2013;Alm, 2019;Slemrod, 2019 ), the evidence for the AS prediction of a (weakly) positive post-audit effect is more nuanced. Consistent with this prediction is a growing body of empirical evidence that uncovers either a strictly positive average post-audit effect ( Kleven et al, 2011;DeBacker et al, 2018a;2018b;Løyland et al, 2019;Beer et al, 2020;Boning et al, 2020;Kotsadam et al, 2021;Mazzolini et al, 2022;Sánchez, 2022;Advani et al, 2021 ), or a zero average post-audit effect (e.g., Gemmell and Ratto, 2012;Best et al, 2021 ). Two recent experiments also report a zero average post-audit effect ( Choo et al, 2013;Kasper and Alm, 2022a ).…”

Section: Post-audit Compliance Effectsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Tax compliance after an audit: Higher or lower?

Kasper¹,

Rablen²

2023

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Post-audit Compliance Effectsmentioning

confidence: 95%

Tax compliance after an audit: Higher or lower?

Kasper¹,

Rablen²

2023

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…11 In a recent paper, Sánchez (2022) uses an RD design to estimate the effects of receiving a non‐compliance notification.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement

Løyland,

Raaum,

Torsvik

et al. 2023

Economica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper demonstrates how tax administrations can evaluate future compliance gains from risk‐based tax enforcement that audits all taxpayers above a risk threshold. Expanding tax enforcement in this setting means reducing the audit threshold. The compliance gains from such an expansion consist of a mechanical audit correction effect and a behavioural effect that reflects changes in self‐reporting in the subsequent years. We estimate this behavioural effect in a regression discontinuity analysis with the risk score as the forcing variable. We find that taxpayers at the margin had a significant reduction in self‐reported deductions in the next years' tax filing. The behavioural effect over a three‐year post‐audit period is estimated to be of a magnitude similar to that of the direct adjustment of the audit. This compliance effect does not change when we include the reporting of the spouse. We find that the risk score threshold that maximizes net public revenue from the audits is considerably below current practice.

show abstract

Non-compliance notifications and taxpayer strategic behavior: evidence from Ecuador

Cited by 2 publications

References 29 publications

Tax compliance after an audit: Higher or lower?

Tax compliance after an audit: Higher or lower?

Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About