Non-conceptualism and the Myth of the Given

Abstract

Defenders of non‐conceptualism have been accused of falling into the Myth of the Given. This is John McDowell's main objection to non‐conceptualism. In this article I evaluate some well‐known non‐conceptualist responses to that objection. My analysis shows that non‐conceptualists have not provided plausible explanations for the epistemic role of experience. As a consequence, McDowell's objection seems to be correct. The structure of the article is as follows: first, taking into account the debate between conceptualists and non‐conceptualists, I shed light on what the Myth of the Given is. Second, I critically examine Richard Heck's, Christopher Peacocke's and Robert Hanna's proposals on how experiences justify beliefs. I end the article by clarifying the scope of McDowell's criticism.

A new case of the Myth of the Given?

“…15 In the 1980s and 1990s, the debate was about whether experience has conceptual or non-conceptual content (see, for example, Brewer, 1999;Crane, 1992;Cussins, 2003;Dretske, 1981;Evans, 1982;Hanna, 2011Hanna, , 2015Heck, 2000;McDowell, 1996McDowell, , 2009Peacocke, 1992). I argue in favour of conceptualism in Kalpokas (2018). At any rate, in the present debate, non-conceptualists are on the side of conceptualists, because both hold that experience is contentful.…”

Perception as a contentful relation

“…For instance, let us consider the role of concepts in experience 23 . Commonly, we identify, or recognize, objects, properties, etc., by perceiving them as falling under the relevant concepts (Kalpokas, 2018). Let us suppose now that concepts penetrate experience and, by perceiving a certain item as falling under a concept, the item looks like the sort of thing that is part of the extension of the concept in question.…”

“…I cannot argue for conceptualism here. For a defense of conceptualism, seeKalpokas (2018). In any case, what is important here is the acknowledgement that there is a representational component in perceptual content, whatever its nature is.24 For a congenial approach to the present one, seeGiananti (2018).25 This does not apply to Evans, who, though an advocate of de re senses, holds that perceptual content is non-conceptual.26 In this sense, McDowell holds that objects "figure in" singular thoughts, but they are not constituents of them.…”

“…I cannot argue for conceptualism here. For a defense of conceptualism, see Kalpokas (2018). In any case, what is important here is the acknowledgement that there is a representational component in perceptual content, whatever its nature is.…”