Non-linear dynamic panel data analysis for debt-equity choice and its impact on moral hazard problems

Abstract

Abs tract:Mo ral ha zard agen cy pro blems take place when ris ky debt is is sued. The do mi nant sha re hol ders have op por tu ni ties to make de ci si ons which ef fect weal th transfer. In se ve ral re cent the o ries, debt-equ i ty cho ice, which de als with agen cy pro blems as su mes that fi nan cing and in vest ment de ci si ons are se pa ra ble. The se stu dies have been cri ti ci zed due to the fact that both de ci si ons are in ter de pen dent. The pur po se of the pre sented pa per is to test em pi ri cal ly the mo ral ha zard pro blem of debt-equ i ty cho ice in In do ne sia. This stu dy pro vi des evi den ce that the le vel of debt is not se cu red by the suf fi ci ent col la te ral and is also not sup por ted by growth op por tu ni ties. It se ems that In do ne si an com pa nies use debt also to fi nan ce ope rati ons and not only for real in vest ment.Key words: debt-equ i ty cho ice, mo ral ha zard, as set sub sti tu ti on pro blem, In do ne si an com pa nies JEL Clas si fi cati on: C230, O530 In tro ducti onMo ral ha zard pro blem is one of main fi nan cial is sues, which is re la ted to debt-equ i ty cho ice in In do ne si an com pa nies. The se is sues are re la ted to both fi nan cing and in vestment de ci si ons si mul ta ne ous ly. Pre vi ous stu dies as su me that both de ci si ons are se pa rable. In se ve ral re cent the o ries, par ticu lar ly tho se which deal with agen cy pro blems, sepa rati on does not take place (Wil li am son, 1981).Ta king into ac count In do ne si an fi nan cial is sues, pre vi ous stu dies point out that Indo ne si an com pa nies suffer from high le vel of debt (Claes sens, Djan kov, & Ne no va, 2000;Husnan, 2001) and also they pre fer debt to fi nan ce their in vest ment re gar dless of the col la te ral as sets or firm pro fi ta bi li ty (Kwik, 1994(Kwik, , 1996 Wi bi so no, 1998; Se ti a wan, 2004). Agen cy pro blem exists when ris ky debt is is sued, due to sha re hol ders ha ving oppor tu ni ties to make de ci si ons, which ef fect weal th transfers from sha re hol ders to debthol ders. Be si des, pre vi ous stu dies on debt-equ i ty cho ice as su me that fi nan cing and