Non-Muslim citizens as foreigners within: how Ecnebi became Yabancı from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic

Abstract

Serap the schoolteacher noticed the epigraph above the fountain. It read: 'Pious donation of Mıgdıs, son of Barad.' She could not understand. This was a foreign word, but what did it mean? Hacı Amca, who had performed the ablutions for the prayer, leant towards the fountain's basin to drink his fill. After having said 'Thank be to God,' he whispered, 'May you rest in peace, Mıgdıs Efendi.' Meanwhile, he turned toward Serap the schoolteacher and started to tell the [following] story: 'My daughter-schoolteacher, Mıgdıs is the name of the Armenian who had this fountain repaired. He was an Ottoman subject. He had established a pious foundation. Yes, Non-Muslim people of these lands, too, have created various foundations.' Serap the schoolteacher had learnt something new. 1 This story takes place in G€ um€ uşhacık€ oy, a village located in the region of Amasya. It appears in a schoolbook published by the Directorate General of Foundations. Its purpose is to highlight to what extent non-Muslim subjects of the sultan played an active role in 'the civilization of pious foundations' (Vakıf medeniyeti) 2 that has been highly glorified by Turkey's Islamist regime in recent years. 3 In the story, the schoolteacher takes an Armenian name for a foreign name. Moreover, the authors of the book mention as 'Magdis Kiregos' someone whose name was probably 'Makdisi Giragos'. 4 This is a well-known fact: like many other people, Turkish citizens often experience difficulties in identifying the origins of proper names. 5 Another reality is less considered by scientific studies and popular literature: in Turkey, someone who would not be considered as a foreigner -Mıgdıs, an Armenian who 'was an Ottoman subject'sometimes comes to be regarded as such. The purpose of the present article is to shed light on this reality from an historical perspective.Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, any non-Muslim born in Turkey, whether Greek, Armenian or Jewish, is a Turkish citizen as much as any of his/her Muslim fellows. Located at the core of Kemalist ideology, this principle was inscribed in constitutional law. As Ismet In€ on€ u, who was a war comrade of Mustafa Kemal and became the President of the Turkish Republic after he died in 1938, once said: 'A Turk is whoever desires and loves to be so.' 6 Tekin Alp who quoted him added: 'To belong to the same nation, it is not necessary to belong either to the same race or religion, but to speak the same language, share the same culture and ideals.' 7 Practically, the founding philosophy of Turkish nationalism was partly implemented through policies of 'turkification' (t€ urkleştirme) conducted during the 1930s. However, many specialists have identified flaws CONTACT Olivier Bouquet

How Informal Institutions Matter

“…5 Although the Turkish state officially recognized some non-Muslim groups as religious minorities and granted them certain religious, cultural, and educational rights, the state has had a skeptical attitude toward non-Muslim communities and their demands. Viewed as "others, " "aliens, " "local foreigners, " "untrustworthy, " "ungrateful, " "the agents of foreign powers, " and "potential threat for national unity and security, " their loyalty and reliability were questioned (see Grigoriadis 2012Grigoriadis , 2021Bayir 2013;Bottoni 2013;Bayar 2014;Bardakci et al 2017;Beylunioğlu 2017;Bouquet 2017;Lord 2018;Akgönül 2019;Oran 2021). As Içduygu, Toktas, and Soner (2008, 359) also observe, in the Turkish context, since Islam has been a constitutive element of the Turkish identity and nation, and being Turkish has often been equated with being Muslim .…”

“…First, in line with the official understandings and attitudes summarized above, state elites attempted to build a purified, standardized, and modernized Turkish language. Second, and related to the first objective, official language policy aimed to protect and promote purified Turkish as the common and dominant language in all spheres of sociopolitical life, and thus achieve linguistic homogeneity in the country (see also Aslan 2007Aslan , 2009Cemiloglu 2009;Ucarlar 2009;Bayir 2013;Atlas 2014;Bouquet 2017;Oran 2021). As a result, the Turkish state tried to exclude, suppress, and, if possible, eliminate minority languages (e.g., Kurdish, Lazuri, Armenian, and Syriac) (İçduygu and Soner 2006;Cemiloglu 2009;Zeydanlıoğlu 2012Zeydanlıoğlu , 2013Bayir 2013;Atlas 2014;Arslan 2015;Sheyholislami 2015).…”