Non-repudiation in the digital environment

McCullagh, Adrian; Caelli, William

doi:10.5210/fm.v5i8.778

Cited by 44 publications

(30 citation statements)

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“…It states that where the law requires a signature, any method (presumably an electronic signature) is valid provided the method is reliable and appropriate for which the information is communicated. Scholars eminent in the field of electronic signatures have criticised such provisions [10,28] which make it hard for legal advisors to advise businesses to use electronic signatures. Note that post-MLEC two other set of laws, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures 2001 (MLES) and the United Nations Convention on the use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 2005 (the Convention) have been drafted by the UNCI-TRAL that address the drawbacks in the initial model law.…”

Section: An Analysis Of Participants' Viewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resistance to change: six reasons why businesses don’t use e-signatures

Srivastava

2011

Electron Commer Res

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Over the last decade, various pieces of legislation have been enacted and policies developed both on national and international fronts in order to promote the usage of electronic signatures. However, paper-based signatures are still the preferred instrument to electronic signatures for entering into contracts and commercial transactions. What are the causes of this apathy on the part of the business community? Why is there a resistance towards electronic signatures in this era of e-business?This paper conducts a comprehensive empirical investigation to examine factors that have contributed to the low acceptance of electronic signatures, in particular the digital signature, in the Australian business community. The six main factors that have been identified are: the prevailing culture and customs associated with manuscript signatures; ignorance about the electronic signature technology; legal concerns; security issues; the cost of using the technology; and the complexity associated with its setting up and usage. The paper also makes some useful suggestions that may encourage businesses to use electronic signatures in order to facilitate the growth of e-commerce.

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Section: An Analysis Of Participants' Viewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resistance to change: six reasons why businesses don’t use e-signatures

Srivastava

2011

Electron Commer Res

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“…Security policies for SoSs rely on an communication-centric approach that maintains the integrity of system components, protects the confidentiality of information, and provides continued availability to systems [1,2]. We derive the set of policy types from industry standards including the Department of Defense Goal Security Architecture (DGSA) [3], the Common Criteria [4], Carnegie Mellon University's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [2], the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) minimum security requirements [5], and the NIST 800 series of publications [6]. An empirical study of these documents reveals significant corroboration of the policy types across the documents.…”

Section: Security Certification Modeling Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The DGSA defines seven core policy types [3]. The Common Criteria contains eleven functional classes for security policies [4]. NIST isolates security requirements across seventeen different categories [5].…”

Section: Security Certification Modeling Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Certification Modeling

Gamble¹

2009

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Public reporting burden tor this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, Including the time for reviewing instructions data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect o this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188). 121-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection valid OMB control number PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

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“…Such systems are a cost effective way to protect the sensitive information delivered across a public data highway and to univocally identify the owner of certain credentials provided directly by the service supplier or transversely by a certification chain in a deferred way. Whereas for most electronic commerce applications such methodology fits well in a globally accepted scenario [2], in some real life situations the recourse to a deferred trusting authority results at least questionable [3]. In order to point up the spirit of such criticism we spotlight a certain dichotomy between the common sense of "trust" and the effective practice of reducing trust to a formal verification of a digital signature as in electronic commerce applications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A consistent history authentication protocol

Rotondi

Guerrera

2006

SIGSOFT Softw. Eng. Notes

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Traditional strong authentication systems rely on a certification chain to delegate the authority of trusting an intermediate end.However, in some practical life scenarios a relayed authentication is not accepted and thus it would be advisable a straight proof of trustiness with a direct interaction with the involved party. Our protocol introduces a registry of certified operations from which it descends the authentication and the consequent proof of identity. Despite the fact that such system requires for registrar initialization, the Consistent History Protocol provides a reasonable degree of reliability in identifying subjects at the steady state. As application, we deployed the protocol in the indirect electronic data collection scenario, where large data flows have to be exchanged and certified among a set of mutually trusted Institutions. The experimental results report the processing overhead introduced by the authentication protocol, which results negligible with respect a classical strong authentication method built around the OpenSSL library.

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Non-repudiation in the digital environment

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Resistance to change: six reasons why businesses don’t use e-signatures

Resistance to change: six reasons why businesses don’t use e-signatures

Security Certification Modeling

A consistent history authentication protocol

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