Non-state Actors and Global Crime Governance: Explaining the Variance of Public-private Interaction

Abstract

This article: • Shows the variance of non-state actors in global crime governance and transnational governance in general, and shows that existent accounts fail to explain this variance. • Proposes a model of how we can understand the different roles of non-state actors, distinguishing normative from rationalist reasons for non-state actor involvement. • Compares different forms of current global crime governance (human trafficking, conflict diamonds, money laundering, cybercrime) to explore the validity of the model. • Shows that non-state activism and public debate are usually only related to a specific type of crime, turning a 'blind eye' to other forms of crime and their governance. • Argues that this creates problems with regard to oversight and discussion of global crime governance, exemplified with regard to intelligence surveillance via internet traffic. Global crime governance has become a major area of international activity, including a growing number of public and private regulatory efforts. Yet it is puzzling that a considerable variance exists in how state and non-state actors interact: non-state actors have been important agenda-setters in some issue areas, while they have been absent in others. Sometimes they are implementation bodies, sometimes they set regulations themselves. I argue that this variance is caused by issue characteristics: If an issue area is framed in a highly moralised way, it is likely that resulting nongovernmental activity can be explained by normative convictions, and in particular advocacy occurs frequently. If an issue area is framed in a technical way, resource exchange is central, and delegation to non-state actors becomes more prominent. A comparison of human trafficking, conflict diamonds, money laundering and cybercrime shows that this relation can be found on the global and national level.

From financing needs to criminal terrorism: The role of terrorist financing in crime-terror relations

“…These are cases in which the terrorist organisation collaborates closely and continuously with criminal organisations, establishing a permanent alliance to reap greater benefits. Meanwhile, organised crime -even organisations that have more hierarchical structures and elements of national or ethnic identity -have expanded the geographical limits of their activities, increasing and intensifying their cooperation processes with other violent actors in different regions of the planet and thereby leading to what is known as global crime or globalisation of organised crime (Galeotti 2014, Bouchard and Morselli 2014, Akobi 2016. Collaboration with terrorist groups can undermine the political structures of states in conflict or situations of structural violence, reducing the capabilities of their security forces and allowing them to carry out their illegal businesses with greater impunity, including theft, fraud, contract killings and trafficking of arms, drugs, luxury goods and humans, although in principle they do not seek to take control of the state, declare war on it or overthrow the government (McDonald 2013).…”

Governing criminal markets: The role of private insurers in kidnap for ransom

“…Private firms have therefore created a plethora of norms, institutions, and regimes to fill this governance vacuum (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999;Jakobi, 2015;Stringham, 2015). States can only provide international governance cooperatively and are often unable (or slow) to develop the necessary institutions to do so.…”

“…States can only provide international governance cooperatively and are often unable (or slow) to develop the necessary institutions to do so. Private firms have therefore created a plethora of norms, institutions, and regimes to fill this governance vacuum (Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999;Jakobi, 2015;Stringham, 2015). Insurers have already received attention as governance providers in international affairs (Cutler et al, 1999;Haufler, 1997Haufler, , 1999.…”

Global Crime Governance: Perspektiven und Grenzen transnationaler Kooperation

“…Ähnliche Aktivitäten sind auch in anderen internationalen Organisationen gängig, beispielsweise die Konvention der Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD) gegen Korruption, die EU-Direktiven zu Geldwäsche oder die Konvention des Europarates zu Cyberkriminalität. Die bestehenden multilateralen und bilateralen Aktivitäten sind allerdings häufig unzureichend, weshalb zunehmend andere Governance-Mechanismen entwickelt werden, mitunter unter Einbeziehung privater Akteure (Jakobi 2013;Jakobi und Wolf 2013;Jakobi 2015).…”