Non-union employee representation, union avoidance and the managerial agenda

Abstract

Non-union employee representation is an area which has attracted much interest in the voice literature.Much of the literature has been shaped by a dialogue which considers NERs as a means of union avoidance. More recently however scholars have suggested that for NERs to work in such contexts, they may need to be imbued with a higher set of functionalities to remain viable entities. Using a critical case study of a union recognition drive and managerial response in the form of an NER, this paper contributes to a more nuanced interpretation of this dialogue. A core component of the findings directly challenge existing interpretations within the field; namely that NERs are shaped by a paradox of managerial action. it is argued that the NER failed to deliver for employees because of structural remit, rather than through any paradox in managerial intent.

Channels of employee voice: complementary or competing for space?

“…Organisations can, and often do, employ a range of voice channels, especially different types of direct forms (Holland et al ., ; Lavelle et al ., ; Marginson et al ., ). There is scepticism about the extent to which ‘true’ voice occurs from non‐union (indirect or direct) channels which are often seen as a management‐led process where appearance and process, as opposed to effective engagement, dominate (Donaghey et al ., ; Strauss, ). It is argued that non‐union mechanisms are overly‐reliant on employer goodwill (Cullinane et al ., ) and purely implemented to enhance performance (Poole, Lansbury, and Wailes, ).…”

“…It is argued that non‐union mechanisms are overly‐reliant on employer goodwill (Cullinane et al ., ) and purely implemented to enhance performance (Poole, Lansbury, and Wailes, ). Cases have emerged in which representatives use the process to advance their own agenda, making them reluctant to defy management (Donaghey et al ., ; Upchurch et al ., ) or are so swayed by unitarist managerial ideology that they succumb to pressure to unquestioningly accept the legitimacy of managerial prerogative (Butler, ). Employees are thus collaborating ‘in their own exploitation’ (Marchington and Wilkinson, : 407).…”

“…The spirit behind the directive was to give employees greater information, involvement and influence over decisions impacting their work environment (Bull et al ., ). While this could have led to greater engagement with union representation arrangements, invariably the focus shifted to NER structures, defined as ‘employer sponsored bodies of formally organized employee voice’ (Donaghey et al ., : 164). This is in no small part attributed to the high degree of freedom afforded to employers in countries such as the UK and Ireland (Charlwood, ).…”

Employment regulation, game theory and weak employee voice in liberal economies

“…The degree of information and consultation assesses the extent to which employees and/or their representatives influence and share management decisions, ranging from basic one-way information provision, through two-way communication, to -at the top end of the scale -codetermination. Most information and consultation gravitates towards the bottom of this scale: it is often a mix of information dissemination, two-way communication, and possibly elements of informal consultation (Donaghey et al, 2012). Level refers to the locus where information and consultation occurs: task, team, workplace, establishment, division, and headquarters.…”

“…Marchington and Suter (2013) note that while information and consultation can exist at headquarters level in multinationals -worker directors on boards, for instance -it mostly occurs at lower levels. Scope refers to the range of issues over which employees have some say (Donaghey et al, 2012). This may vary considerably from fairly trivial "tea and toilet" issues (e.g.…”