In this note, I present a problem for a certain natural view about the structure of the world.I show that this view is committed to a particular strengthening of atomism, which I call superatomism. Superatomism has some counterintuitive consequences (e.g. it rules out what Markosian [] calls the 'pointy view' of simples). I consider some ways of avoiding this commitment, and draw some additional implications for priority monism.Consider the following picture of the structure of the world, which I will call the
.Mereology Necessarily, the parthood relation is governed by the axioms of classical mereology.Priority Necessarily, the existence of parts is metaphysically prior to the existence of the wholes they compose.Well-foundedness Necessarily, the metaphysical priority relation is well-founded; there can be no infinite regress of priority.e thesis is accepted by a great many contemporary metaphysicians -most saliently, David Lewis []. Importantly, is quite a bit stronger than required for the argument.All that is required is the assumption that the parthood relation is a partial order. (For ease of presentation, though, it will be useful to stay within the setting of classical mereology.) e thesis also seems to be a predominant view in contemporary metaphysics. ere are several kinds of ontological dependence, but the notion of grounding (introduced by Kit Fine [, ]) has been gaining traction. I use 'metaphysical priority' here to be fairly neutral with respect to precisely which kind of dependence relation is taken to be in play. e - thesis is a standard assumption about priority relations. e thought is that if there were infinite descending priority chains, we would be deferring the 'ground' of things indefinitely. e existence of objects