Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction

Abstract

I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s First Critique, according to which one can enjoy a Kantian intuition without possessing any concepts, and present an alternative reading. The argument is that nonconceptualist readings are forced to construe the Transcendental Deduction in one of three ways, none of which is acceptable: The Deduction is seen either (i) as inconsistent with the Transcendental Aesthetic; or (ii) as addressing a question of fact rather than a question of legitimacy; or (iii) as articulating a position that Kant himself criticizes as a form of scepticism. Consideration of the third alternative, in particular, shows that a more promising construal of the Deduction must be based on a different interpretation of Kant’s claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.

Kant on space, time, and respect for the moral law as analogous formal elements of sensibility

“…17 For a recent account of the Transcendental Deduction that is compatible with many of the general claims I make here, see Land (2015). Gregor translates this as, '(if I may be allowed, merely by an analogy, to use these terms, which are not altogether suitable)' (p. 212 of the Cambridge edition).…”

“…Gregor translates this as, '(if I may be allowed, merely by an analogy, to use these terms, which are not altogether suitable)' (p. 212 of the Cambridge edition). 17 For a recent account of the Transcendental Deduction that is compatible with many of the general claims I make here, see Land (2015). 18 Because, as I have pointed out above, the practical analogue I aim to develop does not involve synthesizing a manifold of content to represent objects given from elsewhere, I have abstracted from the details Kant gives to describe the exact nature of the synthesis that produces space and time as formal intuitions possessing unity.…”

“…For a helpful survey and refutation of this criticism, seeReath (2006a). See alsoLand (2015).8 Key to a complete treatment is the claim that we must distinguish between respect as formal incentive-a purely moral incentive, which may or may not determine the subject's will in a given case-and respect as the more general form of sensibility that makes moral agency possible and is a necessary element of every act of will. 4(Guyer, 2000, p. 365).…”

“…For an excellent critical survey of existing positions that outlines what Kant's positive view must look like, seeLand (2011). See alsoLand (2015).8 Key to a complete treatment is the claim that we must distinguish between respect as formal incentive-a purely moral incentive, which may or may not determine the subject's will in a given case-and respect as the more general form of sensibility that makes moral agency possible and is a necessary element of every act of will. This closely parallels Kant's distinction between the formal intuitions of space and time, and our spatiotemporal form of intuition in the first Critique (B161).…”

Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding

“…6 See KU,5:402;Anth,7:142;FM,20:324;EE,20:227n.,20:245;N,23:28;LP,24:502;R220,15:84,R4636,17:620. 7 Some commentators distinguish interpretations where concepts must be applied in judgment in order for intuition to arise, from interpretations which instead hold that a non-judgmental use of concepts is required (Grüne 2009;Land 2015). The passages noted above constitute prima facie evidence against both.…”