Noncooperative game theory in response surface methodology decision of pricing strategy in dual-channel supply chain

Widodo, Erwin; Januardi, Januardi

doi:10.1080/21681015.2020.1848932

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…For example, this study did not include straw manufacturers and straw recycling in the model. Additionally, this research did not consider price sensitivities in the manner of Widodo and Januardi [33]. Therefore, these will be added in future research to create more in-depth studies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Strategy of China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban Based on Consumer Heterogeneity and Retailer Competition

Wang

Wei

2022

Sustainability

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The Chinese government has issued a new “Plastic Restriction Ban” requiring that, by the end of 2020, the food and beverage industry across the country bans the use of single-use, nondegradable plastic drinking straws. The governance of plastic drinking straws is a multi-dimensional and complex process. Therefore, based on the heterogeneity of consumers, this paper constructs a tripartite game model (the government, retailers, and consumers) for the governance of plastic drinking straws in China. Under this model, this research derives an optimal strategy in both monopoly and competitive markets, assuming the government has access to two policy tools, fines and subsidies. The research results suggest the following. (1) In monopoly markets, when (a) the fine or subsidy fee is high or (b) the fine or subsidy fee is low and the number of environment-conscious consumers is high, retailers are more inclined to provide biodegradable drinking straws. (2) Consumer heterogeneity has a certain impact on policy results; when there are enough environment-conscious consumers, policy costs can be reduced. (3) For high-quality products, the policy costs in competitive markets is lower than in monopoly markets; for low-quality products, the policy costs in competitive markets is higher than in monopoly markets. Based on the conclusions, this work suggests the government should focus on cultivating consumers’ environmental awareness and tighter control of products quality, in addition to the two policy tools, i.e., fines and subsidies, because these can reduce policy costs. Consumers should be aware of their own importance to China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban and adopt a refusal to accept plastic drinking straws and reduce the consumption of disposable plastics to support the policy. Retailers should also realize that proactively catering to consumer and government expectations can bring higher benefits to themselves; this can be achieved by providing high-quality biodegradable straws to support China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban. The model of this work could be applied to other corporate activities related to sustainability, such as plastic bags, plastic bottles, etc., and their connection to government policies.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Strategy of China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban Based on Consumer Heterogeneity and Retailer Competition

Wang

Wei

2022

Sustainability

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“…Previous literature has summarized a few factors that affect a manufacturer's channel selection. Through an experiment design study, Widodo and Januardi (2020) have explored the effect of dynamic price sensitivity on manufacturer's pricing decisions in each channel. Other studies include the manufacturer's operating costs for the Self-Run platform, the commission fee of the Agency channel (Wang, Leng, and Liang 2018), the competition among the manufacturers (Li and Ai 2019;Zennyo 2020), sales inefficiency in the Agency channel (Yan, Zhao, and Xing 2019;Yan, Zhao, and Liu 2018) and the strategies of E-retailers (Zhang and Zhang 2020;Li et al 2019c), and so forth.…”

Section: Platform Economy and Distribution Channel Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency or Self-Run: the effect of consumer green education on recyclers’ distribution channel choice under platform economy

Ling

Nie

Lim

et al. 2021

International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications

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Agency or Self-Run: the Effect of Consumer Green Education on Recyclers' Distribution Channel Choice under Platform EconomyAbstract： Consumer green education has significantly affected the green supply chain and recyclers have started to distribute remanufactured products via online platforms. Through a two-period game model, this study examines the effects of consumer green education on the recycler's channel choice. The recyclers sell remanufactured products through either the E-retailer's platform (Agency channel), or their own online platform (Self-Run channel). Surprisingly, our research indicates that a new product seller (E-retailer) can benefit from the remanufactured goods' cannibalization in the Agency channel, provided the consumer green education is under-developed. This finding challenges the traditional opinion that the cannibalization causes loss of profit for new-product sellers. Besides, as the consumer green education effect increases, the recycler prefers the Self-Run channel even with high operational costs. This study provides new insights into the recyclers' channel choice by considering the consumer green effect, thereby extending the research on the remanufactured products' distribution channel strategy.

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“…Lou et al [10] assessed a supply chain consisting of two levels, including a manufacturer and a retailer. Finally, Widodo and Januardi [11] considered a dual-channel supply chain and obtained the Nash equilibrium solution. The above studies and the references therein show that price competition attracts much attention in the literature.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price and service competition between two leader-follower retailer-Stackelberg supply chains

2021

IJE

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Noncooperative game theory in response surface methodology decision of pricing strategy in dual-channel supply chain

Cited by 11 publications

References 29 publications

The Optimal Strategy of China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban Based on Consumer Heterogeneity and Retailer Competition

The Optimal Strategy of China’s Plastic Drinking Straws Ban Based on Consumer Heterogeneity and Retailer Competition

Agency or Self-Run: the effect of consumer green education on recyclers’ distribution channel choice under platform economy

Price and service competition between two leader-follower retailer-Stackelberg supply chains

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