Nondestructive determination of plutonium by gamma spectrometry and neutron well coincidence counting

Agarwal, Chhavi; Poi, Sanhita; Nathaniel, T. Newton; Mhatre, Amol; Kalsi, P. C.; Singh, Sadanand; Goswami, A.

doi:10.1016/j.jnucmat.2008.09.038

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 3 publications

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“…This method is referred to as the “apparent mass method” and is widely used for the assay of SNMs in voluminous samples (see the Supporting Information for more discussion on the apparent mass method). The apparent mass method can give a good estimate (2–5%) of the assayed radionuclide in the case of homogeneous samples in a standard geometry container; however, the uncertainty increases up to ∼15% for heterogeneous solid samples. − The apparent mass method relies on the availability of a good number of interference-free γ-rays coming out of the voluminous samples without suffering from infinite attenuation conditions. This limits the applicability of this method for the assay of isotopes with limited detectable γ-ray peaks (for example, 238 U), for samples with high self-attenuation (for example, a larger quantity of SNMs or the presence of high-density packaging materials), and γ-ray spectral interferences (for example, interference of 241 Am in aged Pu samples).…”

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confidence: 99%

In View of “On-Site” Nuclear Forensics and Assay of Fissile Materials in Sealed Packages by High-Resolution γ-Ray Spectrometry

et al. 2023

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Several incidences of nuclear smuggling during the past few decades have raised the demand for the development of a strong “on-site” nuclear forensic infrastructure. High-resolution γ-ray spectrometry (HRGRS) plays an important role in nuclear forensics. However, the existing methodologies, developed primarily for nuclear fuel cycle applications, are relative and rely on the availability of a standard, limiting their use for the absolute assay of special nuclear materials in nonstandard geometry samples with an unknown matrix, which is vital to make a quick “on-site” decision on the severity, potential radiological threat, and intended use of an interdicted package. In this work, a methodology has been developed using HRGRS for quantifying fissile (235U, 239Pu) and other radioisotopes, which is applicable to sealed packages without requiring the knowledge of the sample geometry and the matrices. By combining experiments and Monte Carlo simulations, an iterative methodology has been proposed for “point” to “extended” source absolute efficiency transformation and demonstrated further for the absolute isotopic assay of uranium and plutonium standards, mock-up nuclear forensic samples, and an unknown nuclear material mixture with a nonstandard geometry, compound matrices, and a wide variation in the elemental and isotopic compositions with a view to imitate an “on-site” experience. The present methodology requires an assay time of only a few minutes to an hour and thus promises “on-site” nuclear forensic analysis of suspected flagged packages at borders and ports using high-resolution γ-ray spectrometry. Furthermore, the present methodology is versatile and can also be adopted for wider applications, beyond nuclear forensics.

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