Nondiagnosticity and Typicality Effects in Prediction

Zukier, Henri; Jennings, Dennis L.

doi:10.1521/soco.1984.2.3.187

Cited by 30 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…At a more general level, individuating information is thought to dominate because it is more accessible in memory (Borgida & Brekke, 1981). In line with Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) work on the base rate fallacy, the similarity between the target person and the typical member of the category also seems to play an important role (Nisbett, Zukier & Lemley, 1981;Zukier, 1982;Zukier & Jennings, 1984). More recently, researchers seem to agree that people will also use information to the extent that it appears useful (Ginossar & Trope, 1980, 1987Krueger & Rothbart, 1988).…”

Section: The Illusion Of Receiving Individual Informationmentioning

confidence: 84%

The Social Judgeability Approach to Stereotypes

Leyens

Yzerbyt

Schadron

1992

European Review of Social Psychology

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Section: The Illusion Of Receiving Individual Informationmentioning

confidence: 84%

The Social Judgeability Approach to Stereotypes

Leyens

Yzerbyt

Schadron

1992

European Review of Social Psychology

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“…Subjects moderated their estimate of the probability that the red box was being sampled when a draw of red beads (i.e., diagnostic information) was followed by a draw of blue beads (i.e., irrelevant information). Similarly, Zukier and Jennings (1983) found that jurors were less likely to find a man guilty of murdering his aunt when diagnostic information (e.g., "He was known to have argued with his aunt") was supplemented with irrelevant information (e.g., "The defendant is of average height and vision").…”

Section: The Dilution Effectmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Yet, although selective hypothesis testing can explain the dilution effect when the irrelevant information is unlikely given either hypothesis, it cannot account for demonstrations of the dilution effect that use typical irrelevant information. For example, Zukier and Jennings (1983) observed dilution effects with irrelevant information that is likely given either hypothesis (e.g., the defendant is of average height and vision). Thus, we propose that while selectivity is a necessary assumption for a biased hypothesis testing account of the dilution effect, it is not sufficient.…”

Section: Biased Hypothesis Testingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumers’ Beliefs about Product Benefits: The Effect of Obviously Irrelevant Product Information

Meyvis¹,

Janiszewski²

2002

J CONSUM RES

153

146

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When consumers try to assess the performance of a product on a key benefit, their information search often reveals both diagnostic information and irrelevant information. Although one would expect irrelevant information to have little impact on predictions of product performance, we present evidence that the irrelevant information systematically weakens consumers' beliefs that the product will provide the benefit. We show that this dilution effect persists after subjects have acknowledged the irrelevance of the additional information but that it does depend on whether the product information is processed with the desired benefit in mind. We conclude that consumers are selectively looking for information that suggests the product will deliver the desired benefit and that they categorize any additional evidence, be it irrelevant or disconfirming, as not confirming. As a consequence, irrelevant information weakens consumers' beliefs in the product's ability to deliver the benefit.

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“…The current research is concerned with how judgments might be influenced by irrelevant character or background information presented in a criminal case. Zukier andJennings (1983-1984) examined the influence of nondiagnostic information on judgments of guilt of a defendant in a murder trial. As in Nisbett et al (1981) and Zukier (1982), some subjects considered only information that was predictive of guilt in a mock trial, while others also received nondiagnostic information.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

1998

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Judgments about others are often based on information that varies in terms of its diagnosticity or usefulness in predicting a certain outcome. Previous studies have demonstrated a "dilution effect" in which the addition of nondiagnostic or irrelevant information yields less extreme judgments than those based solely on diagnostic information. Two studies investigated the dilution effect in a juror decision making context in which no midpoint of a scale was provided by researchers. Study 1 examined the inclusion of positive, negative, or neutral character information in a criminal case and found that this nondiagnostic information affected attitude toward the defendant but did not "dilute" guilt judgments. The cases in Study 1 contained a larger amount of diagnostic information than studies that demonstrated the dilution effect. Thus, the amount of diagnostic evidence provided was varied in Study 2, and the results showed "diluted" judgments only when a small amount of diagnostic information was presented. Limitations to the dilution effect were discussed.Person perception and social cognition are areas in which interests have focused on the way people perceive and make judgments about others (see Fiske and Taylor, 1991, for a review). Many early approaches emphasized normative standards, often through the construction of models of optimal decision making. Other approaches focused on documenting factors that affect judgments, many times indicating how the decision maker departs from operations specified by these normative models. When compared to the normative standard, the decision maker often falls short by relying on less than optimal strategies, intuitions, and heuristics that may lead to "biased" decisions (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). For example, in a job interview, an interviewer must make an inference about someone's character and a judgment of the likelihood that the applicant will be an efficient employee. While a systematic or mathematical model may be used in this judgment, interviewers typically make intui-

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Nondiagnosticity and Typicality Effects in Prediction

Cited by 30 publications

References 2 publications

The Social Judgeability Approach to Stereotypes

The Social Judgeability Approach to Stereotypes

Consumers’ Beliefs about Product Benefits: The Effect of Obviously Irrelevant Product Information

Dilution in legal decision making: Effect of non-diagnostic information in relation to amount of diagnostic evidence

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