None of the Above

Abstract

This book examines the nearly one-quarter of American and Canadian adults who say they have no religion. Who are they? Why, and where, has this population grown? How do religious nones in the United States and Canada compare? What are the dynamics of being a religious none in contemporary America and Canada, and how does this willful distance from organized religion impact other aspects of daily and social life? This book turns to survey and interview data to answer these questions against the backdrop of three theoretical frameworks in the sociology of religion: stages of decline, individualization and spiritualization, and polarization. The central claim is that there is a gradual religious decline happening in stages across time and generations and at different rates in various social, cultural, and regional contexts, leading to the rise of religious nones. Yet, this form of decline does not imply the disappearance of all things religious and spiritual, as a diversity of spiritual beliefs and practices along with nonbelief and secular attitudes coexist and are constantly evolving. The decline of organized religion among large segments of the American and Canadian populations also does not mean that religion is necessarily less relevant for everyday interactions and social life. If anything, that there are now large groups of religious and nonreligious individuals coexisting in both countries could mean there is a greater social divide and distance in moral and political values and behaviors along religious/nonreligious lines, as well as in interactions and attitudes between the religious and nonreligious.

Generational Change in Religion and Religious Practice: A Review Essay

“…Most young adults in the United States do express generally positive feelings about religion in general, while wishing that churches could be more “relevant” and welcoming to their generation (Smith and Snell 2009; Hardy et al 2014; Ari 2012; Clydesdale and Garces-Foley 2019; Denton and Flory 2020). In this they differ from their Canadian counterparts, who are more suspicious of organized religion overall (Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme 2020).…”

“…Academic studies documenting the changes in religious beliefs and practice among young adults have employed a wide range of research methods. Many are based on yearly, nation-wide, surveys such as the General Social Survey in the United States or the Canadian Social Survey (Hout and Fischer 2014; Brauer 2018; Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme 2020). Others are drawn from specifically-commissioned national surveys (Penner et al 2011; Pew Research Center 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2019; Barna Group 2013, 2019a, 2019b; Hiemstra et al 2018; Bibby et al 2019; Clydesdale and Garces-Foley 2019).…”

“…Penner et al (2011) divide Canadian young adults into four categories—“Engagers,” “Fence Sitters,” “Wanderers,” and “Rejecters”—which are not the same as the ones listed by Pearce and Denton. Other authors focus on the non-religious segment of young adults, dividing this subgroup into various further classifications (Bengtson 2013; Jones et al 2016; McCarty and Vitek 2017; Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme 2020). The number of categories each author proposes, and the different criteria they use to assign their respondents to one or the other of these categories, make it difficult to compare them.…”

“…Despite their different categorization systems, studies agree that the two most recent generations of young adults in North America are less likely than preceding generations to identify with any established religion, and more likely to be religious “nones” (Smith and Snell 2009; Penner et al 2011; Pew 2012, 2019; Chan et al 2015; Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme 2017, 2020; Bengtson et al 2018; Hiemstra et al 2018; Bibby et al 2019; Clydesdale and Garces-Foley 2019; Denton and Flory 2020; Sadowski 2021). They are less likely to hold orthodox beliefs about religious doctrine and moral issues (D'Antonio et al 2001, 2007; Smith and Snell 2009; Farrell 2011; Penner et al 2011; Hardy et al 2014; Puffer 2017; Twenge 2017; Jacobs et al 2019; Pew 2019).…”

“…This, however, causes a difficulty. Much of the social science literature assumes that religious belief and practice has undergone a longstanding and continuing decline since at least the Enlightenment era, as societies modernized and the influence of rationalism and scientific discoveries increased (Berger 1967; Martin 1978; Bruce 2002, 2011; Voas and Chaves 2016; Thiessen and Wilkins-LaFlamme 2020). This would imply that each generation of young adults will necessarily be less religious than its predecessor, thus rendering futile any attempts by churches to stem or reverse the decline.…”