Nonexistent Objects as Truth-Makers: Against Crane’s Reductionism

Casati, Filippo; Fujikawa, Naoya

doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9710-2

Cited by 20 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“… See Crane (2001 and essays reprinted in his (2014).4 Azzouni (2014) andCasati and Fujikawa (2016) have shown, in my view convincingly, that Crane's psychologism entails some sort of Meinongianism. However, I do not intend to discuss this issue here.…”

mentioning

confidence: 77%

On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality

Zarepour

2018

Acta Anal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane's psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 77%

On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality

Zarepour

2018

Acta Anal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It is interesting to notice that, for completely different reasons, such an assimilation has been defended by Casati as well (Casati forthcoming).13 Voltolini's contribution contains an interesting comparison between noneism (or, more generally, Meinongianism) and Crane's psychological reductionism. For the readers that are intrigued by the topic, it can be helpful to mention that a similar comparison has been discussed byCasati and Fujikawa (2016), and Priest (2016, Ch. 14.6.1).Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…2 He did refuse to compromise with Princeton University because he thought that his research was not properly supported: for this reason, he left the institution without completing his doctoral studies. 3 He did refuse to compromise about his ethical principles by working in a tent, in isolation from city life, lost in the forest on Plumwood Mountain. 4 The long list goes on.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction

Casati¹,

Mortensen²,

Priest³

2018

AJL

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

A Theory of Truthmaking

Asay

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the Introduction, I explained why we should take truthmaking seriously. One important moral to be drawn from that discussion is that the idea of truthmaking is alive and well in philosophy, even if sometimes left implicit. It is not just self-identified truthmaker theorists, then, who deploy the notion of truthmaking. However, it is truthmaker theorists who believe that framing metaphysical questions in terms of truthmaking is a useful way of defending and objecting to metaphysical positions. In fact, this is how I conceive of what it is to be a truthmaker theorist. To be a truthmaker theorist is not to accept any particular metaphysical doctrine; as we shall see, nearly every thesis under discussion within truthmaker theory is contentious. Rather, it is to adopt a methodology, to confront metaphysical questions with the tools and resources of truthmaker theory.  As a result, taking truthmaking seriously does not require taking on the most controversial commitments that have long been associated with it, such as the doctrine that all truths require truthmakers, or that entities such as facts or states of affairs exist. Those are positions that one may ultimately stake out, but they are not compulsory.But what form should such truthmaking arguments take? What kind of theory should truthmaker theorists endeavor to produce? What assumptions are truthmaker theorists allowed to hold when exploring their inquiries? These sorts of questions raise methodological issues for truthmaker theorists, and are of the first importance when developing comprehensive theories of truthmaking. Those who make casual appeals to the notion of truthmaking will also benefit from some reflection on truthmaker methodology, as it is easy to fall into tempting assumptions about truthmaking that are ultimately optional. Hence I could not disagree more with the very first sentence of Dodd (): "To be a truthmaker theorist is to commit oneself to a principle stating that the members of a certain class of true propositions have truthmakers" ().

show abstract

Nonexistent Objects as Truth-Makers: Against Crane’s Reductionism

Cited by 20 publications

References 7 publications

On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality

On Crane’s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality

Introduction

A Theory of Truthmaking

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About