Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality

Yalcin, Seth

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.003.0011

Cited by 230 publications

(160 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…This brings us to our fourth desideratum: our theory should explain this surprising difference between simple disjunctions and disjunctions containing epistemic vocabulary. A semantics for 'or' is missing from Yalcin 2007Yalcin , 2011Yalcin , 2012a, and related papers. Hence the relevant challenge for Yalcin is to state a semantics that predicts the behavior just described.…”

Section: :12mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary

Moss

2015

S&P

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This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility and necessity modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability measures rather than sets of worlds as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism, it makes up for in strength -namely, the theory accounts for a host of distinctive and suggestive linguistic data collected and explored in this paper.Keywords: epistemic modals; indicative conditionals; dynamic semantics; modus ponens; constructive dilemma; context sensitivity; assertion; logical constants There has been much recent debate over the correct semantics for epistemic vocabulary -that is, expressions like the sentential operators in sentences such as:( 1) John might be in his office.(2) John must be in his office.(3) John is probably in his office.(4) If John is in the building, he is in his office.This paper explores a rich source of data for theories of this vocabulary. The debate over the viability of standard truth conditional theories has called attention to the distinctive behavior of epistemic vocabulary in eavesdropping * Thanks to

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Section: :12mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary

Moss

2015

S&P

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“…Finally, there are many questions of detail about the probabilistic analysis, including what interpretation of probability is appropriate, exactly what types of information -and whose -are relevant, whether probability statements have ordinary truth-conditions (Yalcin 2010a), and whether even probability is a rich enough representation format (Halpern 2003). However these questions are resolved, though, it seems clear that numerical probability -or something with its core properties -plays a crucial role in the semantics of epistemic modals.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gradable epistemic modals, probability, and scale structure

Lassiter

2010

SALT

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The epistemic modals possible, probable, likely, and certain require a semantics which explains their behavior both as modal operators and as gradable adjectives. An analysis of these items in terms of Kennedy & McNally's (2005) theory of gradability suggests that they are associated with a single, fully closed scale of possibility. An implementation using the standard theory of modality due to Kratzer is shown to make incorrect predictions in several domains. However, identifying the scale of possibility with standard numerical probability explains the facts about gradability and avoids the undesirable predictions of Kratzer's theory.Keywords: gradability, comparison, epistemic modals, probability Gradable modalsMost discussion of the semantics of English modals has focused on the meanings of modal auxiliaries such as must, should, and can, illustrated in (1).(1) a. Harry should be in Sacramento by now.b. My brother can bench press 250 pounds.c. All cameras must be checked at the door.However, English also has a substantial number of adjectival modals such as likely, obligatory, able, and evident. These items are readily gradable, just like the large and well-studied class of gradable adjectives. Some examples are given in (2a)-(2d). * Special thanks to Chris Barker and Seth Yalcin, both of whom have been enormously helpful and inspiring regarding this project. Thanks also to Anna Szabolcsi, Philippe Schlenker, Chris Kennedy, Larry Horn, Angelika Kratzer, Paul Portner, Pauline Jacobson, Julien Dutant, Chris Collins, Bob Frank, Tom Leu, Eytan Zweig, Tricia Irwin, Salvador Mascarenhas, Tim Leffel, Simon Charlow, and Mike Solomon for inspiration, discussion, copies of unpublished work, data, ideas, and/or help. My initial exposure to the idea of thinking about modality and gradability together came in Seth Yalcin's philosophy of language seminar at NYU in 2008, where he floated the idea that possible and probable were instances of minimum-and relative-standard adjectives in K&M's theory and that probability provided the relevant scale. Though most of our subsequent work was done independently, we have reached similar conclusions, as can be seen by comparing the present paper to the forthcoming Yalcin 2010b.

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“…11 It strikes me as uncontroversial that the distinction between possibilities that are merely compatible with the common ground (which I will sometimes call "plain" possibilities) and those that are live in discourse is real. It is also -as Swanson (2006), Willer (2013a), Yablo (2011), andYalcin (2011) all observe -of theoretical significance for the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals. Here it suffices to highlight the following observation: epistemic might is frequently used in discourse to highlight the theoretical and practical significance of certain possibilities.…”

Section: Basicsmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Instead, we will appeal to the set of sets of possible worlds satisfying everything that is common ground in discourse. Intuitively, a set of possible worlds supports the claim that p might be the case just in case it contains at least one possible world at which p is true, and we may then capture the difference between what is compatible with the common ground and what is explicitly recognized in discourse in a supervaluationist fashion (following Willer 2013a, though see Franke & de Jager 2011, de Jager 2009, Swanson 2006, and Yalcin 2011 for alternative awareness models). 12 If p is compatible with the common ground, ¬p fails to be common ground and so there is at least one set of possible worlds satisfying everything that is 12 Applications of supervaluationist techniques to various philosophical topics can be found, for instance, in Fine 1975, van Fraassen 1966, Kamp 1975, and Thomason 1970.…”

Section: Basicsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Lessons from Sobel sequences

Willer

2017

Semantics and Pragmatics

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Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality

Cited by 230 publications

References 30 publications

On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary

On the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic vocabulary

Gradable epistemic modals, probability, and scale structure

Lessons from Sobel sequences

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