Normative Alethic Pluralism

Ferrari, Filippo

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_7

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Let me briefly comment on each of these commitments. The thought behind (B1) is that given that a < p> belief is a mental state acquired through the mental process of assenting to the truth of <p>, being in a state of <p> belief engenders a commitment to assent to 13 I have written on these topics in Ferrari 2016Ferrari , 2018Ferrari , 2022and Ferrari and Pedersen 2019. 14 The idea of commitments in relation to belief has been discussed in Horgan and Timmons 2006. Commitments (B3), (B4), and (B5) are formulated in terms of the notion of (epistemic) grounds that is meant to capture a wide range of epistemic goods covering all of the following: evidential and non-evidential justification; propositional and doxastic justification; a priori and a posteriori justification; and first-order and higher-order justification.…”

Section: The Normative Profile Of Mental States and Normative Commitm...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disagreement and suspended judgement

Ferrari

2022

Metaphilosophy

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Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition

be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes

as well as with someone who disbelieves

? This paper argues for an affirmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition

. More specifically, the paper first provides a characterisation of the normative profile associated with the state of suspended judgement in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of inquiry. It then provides a characterisation of the notion of disagreement in terms the incompatibility between the sets of normative commitments characteristic of the three states in question—belief, disbelief, and suspension.

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Section: The Normative Profile Of Mental States and Normative Commitm...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disagreement and suspended judgement

Ferrari

2022

Metaphilosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition

be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes

as well as with someone who disbelieves

show abstract

“…7 On normative differences in this context, see e.g. Ferrari (2019), Pedersen (2020). more than that.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shopping for truth pluralism

Gamester

2020

Synthese

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Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse: while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions (or modality, aesthetics, comedy…) might be true in some non-representational or "anti-realist" sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether pluralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different discourses are concerned with different kinds of entities. Arguments that draw on six different ontological contrasts are examined: (i) concrete versus abstract entities; (ii) mind-independent versus mind-dependent entities; (iii) sparse versus merely abundant properties; (iv) objective versus projected entities; (v) natural versus non-natural entities; and (vi) ontological pluralism (entities that literally exist in different ways). I argue that the additional premises needed to move from such contrasts to truth pluralism are either implausible or unmotivated, often doing little more than to bifurcate the nature of truth when a more theoretically conservative option is available. If there is a compelling motivation for pluralism, I suggest, it's likely to lie elsewhere.

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“…Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial… Dualistic alethic pluralism can be associated with what is sometimes called the "platitude-based strategy" (Pedersen & Wright, 2018). Like Edwards, Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch employ this strategy (Pedersen, 2014 andFerrari, 2018 have developed similar accounts). It is, however, debatable to what extent Wright and Lynch employ an overtly dualistic model of truth in the way that Edwards does.…”

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confidence: 99%

Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?

van der Merwe,

Msimang

2023

Acta Anal

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Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit features of both superassertibility (anti-realism) and correspondence (realism). This suggests a fuzzy boundary between realist and anti-realist kinds of truth. There may be a continuum rather than a dichotomy of truths. We conclude by sketching one way for alethic pluralists to accommodate such a notion.

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Normative Alethic Pluralism

Cited by 12 publications

References 33 publications

Disagreement and suspended judgement

Disagreement and suspended judgement

Shopping for truth pluralism

Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?

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