Normative Explanation And Justification^*

Abstract

Normative explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair are ubiquitous in ordinary practice and normative theory. This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well with various theories of normative reasons, makes good sense of certain legitimate moves in ordinary normative explanatory discourse, and helps to make sense of our judgments about explanatory priority in certain cases of normative explanation. This last argument also helps to highlight respects in which normative explanation won't be worryingly discontinuous with explanations in other domains even though these other explanations aren't subject to the justification condition. Thus the paper aims not only to do some constructive theorizing about the relatively neglected topic of normative explanation but also to cast light on the broader question of how normative explanation may be similar to and different from explanations in other domains.

Argumentation and explanation in the law

“…This extra-legal and extra-systemic explanation of legal decisions can be distinguished from the intra-legal and intra-systemic rational explanation (i.e., a rational reconstruction), by which we may understand the attempt to identify reasons why certain decisions may be legally appropriate, given the beliefs, view-point and political-ethical-legal commitments of those who support such decisions (and first of all of the decision-makers who adopted them). A broad notion, which fits with our analysis, is proposed by Väyrynen ( 2021 ) for whom normative explanations are “explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair.” In the context of legal decision-making, we may say that a normative explanation is an account of why a legal evaluation (on the legality, illegality of action, the ascription of rights or obligations) is considered to be correct on the basis of both norms and facts (a combination that was first emphasized by Schroeder, 2005 ).…”

Beyond the Metal Flesh: Understanding the Intersection between Bio- and AI Ethics for Robotics in Healthcare

“…We will then propose a "proof of concept" application of the framework for the use case of CRs through the discussion of an ethical assessment principle by principle. This proof of concept is necessary in the case of normative approach to ensure the relevance of our recommendations, and legitimise our approach such as suggested by Väyrynen [27]. As per Edgett's [20] methodology, we will support our arguments with the existing literature to provide a sufficient background from which we will then be able to draw recommendations, or guidelines, for an ethical development and deployment of CRs.…”

The Source of Epistemic Normativity: Scientific Change as an Explanatory Problem

“…The way I use the term “normative explanation” is different and in one sense quite opposite from the way it has been recently used (Väyrynen 2013; 2019; 2020). In Pekka Väyrynen’s use of the term, what is explained by a normative explanation is why a thing has the normative feature it has.…”