Normativity, Agency, and Value: A view from aesthetics

Abstract

Being for Beauty has two ambitions. It makes a case that the network theory of aesthetic value has enough going for it to be taken seriously in philosophical aesthetics, and in work on practical values and reasons more generally. In addition, by illustrating how much room we have to maneuver outside the bounds of aesthetic hedonism, the book invites work on alternative approaches. James Shelley, Julia Driver, and Samantha Matherne take up the invitation with such aplomb that I am sorely tempted to declare success on the second ambition and merely comment on how their proposals might be further developed. I dislike defensive replies anyway. Nevertheless, since its explanatory power is precisely what gives us room to maneuver, what follows also sticks up for the network theory. 1 | AESTHETIC NORMATIVIT Y: PLAIN VANILLA OR ROCKY ROAD? Shelley has, for a decade, valiantly led the charge against aesthetic hedonism, mounting inventive and rigorous arguments against it, while hinting at his own view. 1 Now, true to his m.o., he further sketches his own view by putting pressure on a move that sets up for the network theory, the decision to punt on the demarcation (or aesthetic) question in favor of the normative question. The kind of view that Shelley sketches is appealing, and we will all one day benefit from its full articulation, but we might well get to that future by punting on the demarcation question. What we should want from a theory of aesthetic value? Being for Beauty opens with a discussion of what Mary Mothersill calls "primitive questions" (Mothersill 1984, p. 71-2). Primitive questions are ones that we ask in advance of theory, that lead us into theory, and that are not so precisely formulated as to presume some theory. In aesthetics, the primitive question is: what is the place of aesthetic value in the good life? Or, what do aesthetic goods bring to my life, to make it a life that goes well? Or, how does beauty deserve the place we have evidently made for it in our lives? Clearly, as Shelley agrees, we must answer the primitive question at the very least by answering the normative question. An answer to the demarcation question tells us what makes some values