Norms and cultural learning in the N-player prisoner’s dilemma

Abstract

Social dilemmas are characterised by a choice between actions which are individually rational but collectively sub-optimal and actions which are better for the collective but leave individuals open to exploitation. Evolutionary game theory has been adopted to model the evolution of successive generations of agents playing a social dilemma game. In evolutionary simulations of N-player social dilemmas, cooperation rarely emerges. This paper investigates cultural evolution (via norms that are recorded as artefacts) as a means to increase the fitness of the society by allowing individual strategies to base their actions, not just on their genetic material, but also to take into consideration (by learning) evidence recorded as artefacts. In the first set of experiments, these norms are propagated vertically and we show that allowing cultural learning for a set of strategies in a small population can result in a stable and cooperative society. In the second set of preliminary experiments, agents are organised spatially according to a random graph and norms are spread horizontally.

Chronotype and Self-Reported Perception of Sleep Quality in Relation to Psychological Inflexibility in Dance Students

“…The context of music education, as in dance, involves specific attributes that make the study of perfectionism particularly pertinent. Perfection in these contexts is often linked to the performer's perception of perfection rather than the achievement of an entirely flawless performance [62]. A student's definition of success is often determined by the preferences of the audience, which includes teachers, peers, family members, and others [63].…”

Effects of Neighbourhood Structure on Evolution of Cooperation in N-Player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

“…In this paper, we consider the effects of neighbourhood structure on the evolution of cooperative behaviour in the NIPD game. Previous works have studied the impact of the number of players [6], payoff function [7], neighbourhood size [7], history length [8], localisation issue [8], population structure [9], generalisation ability [6,10], forgiveness [11], trust [12], cultural learning [13], noise [14], etc but none has investigated the influence of the neighbourhood structure on the evolution of cooperation among players in the context of NIPD. We simulate the NIPD as a multiagent bidding game using a two dimensional grid-world, where each agent is required to bid either high or low against its neighbours based on a chosen game strategy.…”