Norms as ascriptions of violations: An analysis in modal logic

Grossi, Davide

doi:10.1016/j.jal.2010.03.002

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…There has already been a reduction of Standard Deontic Logic [76] to a logic of counts-as conditionals representing evaluative norms [2], colloquially known as 'Anderson's reduction' (as studied in [42,38]). For example, 'B counts-as a violation in a context C'.…”

Section: Abstracting Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated multi-level governance compliance checking

King

Vos

Dignum

et al. 2017

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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An institution typically comprises constitutive rules, which give shape and meaning to social interactions and regulative rules, which prescribe agent behaviour in the society. Regulative rules guide social interaction, in particular when they are coupled with reward and punishment regulations that are enforced for (non-)compliance. Institution examples include legislation and contracts. Formal institutional reasoning frameworks automate ascribing social meaning to agent interaction and determining whether those actions have social meanings that comprise (non-)compliant behaviour. Yet, institutions do not just govern societies. Rather, in what is called multi-level governance, institutional designs at lower governance levels (e.g., national legislation at the national level) are governed by higher level institutions (e.g., directives, human rights charters and supranational agreements). When an institution design is found to be non-compliant, punishments can be issued by annulling the legislation or imposing fines on the responsible designers (i.e., government). In order to enforce multi-level governance, higher governance levels (e.g., courts applying human rights) must check lower level institution designs (e.g., national legislation) for compliance; in order to avoid punishment, lower governance levels (e.g., national governments) must check their institution designs are compliant with higher-level institutions before enactment. However, checking non-compliance of institution designs in multi-level governance is non-trivial. In particular, because institutions in multi-level governance operate at different levels of abstraction. Lower level institutions govern with concrete regulations whilst higher level institutions typically comprise increasingly vague and abstract regulations. To address this issue, in this paper we propose a formal framework with a novel semantics that defines compliance between concrete lower level institutions and abstract higher level institutions. The formal framework is complemented by a sound and complete computational framework that automates compliance checking, which we apply to a real-world case study

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Section: Abstracting Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated multi-level governance compliance checking

King

Vos

Dignum

et al. 2017

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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“…This can be accomplished via constitutive, counts-as norms by using Anderson's reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic allows use a violation constant V , see [4]. This method is suggested by [11] and in a different manner in [12]. Anderson's reduction simply adds a new symbol V to the language of alethic modal logic, and interprets it as 'There is a violation'.…”

Section: Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Consistency: An Xstit Account

Payette

2017

LLP

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Abstract. In this paper we take inspiration from a couple of authors on how to think about normative (in)consistency, and then show how to conceive of normative inconsistency in an xstit framework. One view on normative inconsistency is from von Wright, and the other from Hamblin. These two accounts share a conception of normative inconsistency, but their formal frameworks are very different. We propose a way to get the best of both views on normative inconsistency by using an xstit framework, mixed with a version of Anderson's reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic. We consider variations on those ideas and relate it to a work of Ruth Barcan Marcus.

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‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

Fox

Feis

2017

Inquiry

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In this paper we investigate the 'ought implies can' (OIC) thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.

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Norms as ascriptions of violations: An analysis in modal logic

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Automated multi-level governance compliance checking

Automated multi-level governance compliance checking

Normative Consistency: An Xstit Account

‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

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