Norms in Distributed Organizations

Testerink, Bas; Dastani, Mehdi; Meyer, John‐Jules Ch.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07314-9_7

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Another extension would be to include communicating decentralized traffic control, as described in [8] and [9]. In our current framework, multiple control systems are possible (though not shown in this paper).…”

Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A SUMO Extension for Norm-Based Traffic Control Systems

Baumfalk

Poot

Testerink

et al. 2018

Lecture Notes in Mobility

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Autonomous vehicles will most likely participate in traffic in the near future. The advent of autonomous vehicles allows us to explore innovative ideas for traffic control such as norm based control systems. A norm is a violable rule that describes correct behavior. Norm based traffic control systems monitor traffic and effectuate sanctions in case vehicles violate norms. In this paper we present an extension of SUMO that enables the user to apply norm based control systems to traffic simulations. In our extension, vehicles are capable of making an autonomous decision on whether to comply with the norms or not. We provide a description of the extension, a summary on its implementation and an experimental evaluation.

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Section: Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A SUMO Extension for Norm-Based Traffic Control Systems

Baumfalk

Poot

Testerink

et al. 2018

Lecture Notes in Mobility

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“…Yet when the agents are fully cooperative, there is no need for solutions of the type discussed in this paper, as the agents will follow any plan that maximizes the social welfare (or any other goal externally set for the group) anyhow. Some works have considered cooperation between self-interested agents that can potentially have conflicting goals (Conitzer 2012;Xie et al 2010;Wooldridge et al 2013), in particular aiming at designing norms to guide and constrain agent behavior in order to facilitate cooperation (Haynes, Miles, and Luck 2013;Testerink, Dastani, and Meyer 2013;Hexmoor, Venkata, and Hayes 2006). Other work that considers cooperation between self-interested agents can be found in coalition formation literature (Shehory and Kraus 1998), yet the focus there is mostly on the way coalitions are formed and the division of coalition payoffs, rather than ways of enhancing beneficial individual efforts for the benefit of the coalition.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nurturing Group-Beneficial Information-Gathering Behaviors Through Above-Threshold Criteria Setting

Rochlin

Sarne

Bremer

et al. 2017

AAAI

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This paper studies a criteria-based mechanism for nurturing and enhancing agents' group-benefiting individual efforts whenever the agents are self-interested. The idea is that only those agents that meet the criteria get to benefit from the group effort, giving an incentive to contribute even when it is otherwise individually irrational. Specifically, the paper provides a comprehensive equilibrium analysis of a threshold-based criteria mechanism for the common cooperative information gathering application, where the criteria is set such that only those whose contribution to the group is above some pre-specified threshold can benefit from the contributions of others. The analysis results in a closed form solution for the strategies to be used in equilibrium and facilitates the numerical investigation of different model properties as well as a comparison to the dual mechanism according to only an agent whose contribution is below the specified threshold gets to benefit from the contributions of others. One important contribution enabled through the analysis provided is in showing that, counter-intuitively, for some settings the use of the above-threshold criteria is outperformed by the use of the below-threshold criteria as far as collective and individual performance is concerned.

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Incentivising Monitoring in Open Normative Systems

Alechina

Halpern

Kash

et al. 2017

AAAI

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We present an approach to incentivising monitoring for norm violations in open multi-agent systems such as Wikipedia. In such systems, there is no crisp definition of a norm violation; rather, it is a matter of judgement whether an agent's behaviour conforms to generally accepted standards of behaviour. Agents may legitimately disagree about borderline cases. Using ideas from scrip systems and peer prediction, we show how to design a mechanism that incentivises agents to monitor each other's behaviour for norm violations. The mechanism keeps the probability of undetected violations (submissions that the majority of the community would consider not conforming to standards) low, and is robust against collusion by the monitoring agents.

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Norms in Distributed Organizations

Cited by 3 publications

References 10 publications

A SUMO Extension for Norm-Based Traffic Control Systems

A SUMO Extension for Norm-Based Traffic Control Systems

Nurturing Group-Beneficial Information-Gathering Behaviors Through Above-Threshold Criteria Setting

Incentivising Monitoring in Open Normative Systems

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