North Korea and the Global Nuclear Order

Abstract

For a state that has gained a global reputation as a violator of international norms, not least through its unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s determination to become a nuclear-armed state is puzzling. If nuclear weapons can beget security but also insecurity—as well as other costs—for the state, how might we understand this pursuit, and the delinquent behaviour that has arisen from it? This book will offer an answer to these questions, focusing on North Korea’s quest for status in international relations and developing the theoretical framework of ‘strategic delinquency’. Drawing upon unprecedentedly rich empirical evidence, this book makes the overarching argument that North Korea has strategically deployed behaviour that breaks international norms, and induced low status, in order reap benefits. In so doing, this book posits that North Korea has, over time, learnt that despite the low status and opprobrium that might ensue from delinquent behaviour, bad behaviour can pay.