North Korean Intelligence Structures

Abstract

The North Korean intelligence structures still seem to be an enigma to Western intelligence analysts. Only a few incidents are reported in the media; these are mostly connected to criminal activity and are sometimes based on dubious assumptions. A rather disregarded field of North Korean intelligence is what I call "sub-intelligence." This parameter includes information brokerage, business intelligence, "front" companies, hackers, organized crime, ethnic communities, and so on. It is a global network of intelligence-related subjects that are used by the North Korean government and its huge intelligence bureaucracy. They often occupy simultaneous multiple positions in the security and civilian sectors, which complicates their tracing by Western intelligence.

Criminal state: understanding narcotics trafficking networks in North Korea

“…Although contemporary individual trafficking networks appear to function without direct state involvement, it is unlikely that these activities remain unnoticed in a totalitarian surveillance regime such as North Korea (Blancke, 2014). According to Greitens (2014, p. 45), partially privatised trafficking networks are operating “in a hybrid space between public and private, in relationships where politically powerful people protect and benefit from the activities of those involved in illicit trade.” In the face of growing international pressure, the highest levels of the state appear to have withdrawn support – and even show signs of hostility towards – narcotics trafficking networks.…”

“…For instance, in 2014, Kim Jong-un declared war on gang members who dealt with drugs by conspiring with state security agents. The government confiscated tons of illicit drugs within the national border (Blancke, 2014). Nonetheless, despite these anti-drug actions of the central government, other parts of the state have maintained long-term and deeply entangled connections with private narcotics traders (Hastings, 2014).…”

“…As a consequence, the resilient North Korean illicit network is always able to take advantage of these inconsistent international policies and continue to function effectively (Zhu, 2016). More cooperation is thus required among the USA, China and their allies to not only suppress North Korean drug trafficking, but also fundamentally reverse the criminalisation of the state (Blancke, 2014). As the Chinese Government is always suspicious about the USA’s desire for “regime change” in Pyongyang and its’ overall intention to China (Zhu, 2016), it might be difficult for these two great political powers to reach a consensus.…”

Blut ist dicker als Wasser. Die chinesisch-nordkoreanische Militär- und Geheimdienstkooperation

“…20 Dabei werden meist drei Arten von Einsätzen genannt: Das Aufhalten der Flüchtlingsströme, das Sichern der Ordnung innerhalb Nordkoreas sowie das Sichern der Massenvernichtungswaffen (Glaser et al 2008, s. 19). 21 Zum detaillierten aufbau der strukturen der DVRK siehe Blancke (2009 Im Ausland werden von beiden Staaten unterschiedlich dimensionierte Operationen durchgeführt. Während für die DVRK als politische Hauptziele zunächst die unmittelbaren Nachbarstaaten gelten, stehen die Geheimdienste der VRC in einem globalen Einsatz.…”