Northeast Asia Policy Under George W. Bush: Doctrine in Search of Policy

Abstract

The Bush Doctrine stipulates that unilateral action, regime change, and preemptive attack now define U.S. foreign policy. In Northeast Asia, however, the doctrine has run up against unpleasant realities that ought to be causing-but so far, do not appear to have caused-its abandonment. Instead, the doctrine's new Realism, embellished with strong ideological predispositions, has made the United States odd man out in Asia. This paper critically examines the Bush administration's policy toward China, the Korean peninsula, and Japan. It concludes that, contrary to the view of some observers, 1 and notwithstanding tactical modifications, the Bush Doctrine remains the essential underpinning of U.S. policy in George W. Bush's second administration. Northeast Asia's present and future look very different to Chinese, North Korean, Japanese, and U.S. officials. Reconciling those perspectives will have great bearing on prospects for security in the region. But there must also exist the will to reconcile them. Domestic political factors come into play here-the roles, for example, of bureaucratic self-interest, party alignments, interpretations of history, and ideological preconceptions. In the Bush administration, these factors have lent themselves to a world view that is unprecedentedly exceptionalist and hegemonic in its approach to national-security affairs. The predominant influence behind this world view is the so-called neoconservativespeople such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz who held national security posts in the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations. But even so-called Realists around the president, such as Condoleezza Rice, seem to subscribe to the neocons' belief that the "unipolar moment" for the United States has arrived. 2 The Bush Doctrine dubs this new Realism a "distinctly American internationalism." The doctrine asserts that the United States should take advantage of its enormous and unchallengeable power in world affairs to shape the new century. 3 The 9/11 attacks have provided the opportunity to do so. No state can effectively challenge the United States militarily; nor is there any other viable political or economic model that can pose an alternative to the American way of life. In sustaining superiority, Bush administration officials have said, the use and threat to use force-preventively if necessary-must have wider application than in the past, whereas diplomacymultilateral diplomacy in particular-must operate on a shorter leash than previously. A sustained military buildup, with new capabilities to match wider missions, is crucial to implementing the new doctrine. The help and advice of allies, friendly countries, and international organizations of all kinds are useful only so long as they serve U.S. purposes; otherwise, they are dispensable. International law and cooperation must serve the larger objective of restoring order in the international system.