Northeast Asia’s Aging Population and Regional Security

Sheen, Seongho

doi:10.1525/as.2013.53.2.292

Cited by 6 publications

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“…While ROK currently prefers to reap the benefits of trade with China, concerns over its rapidly aging population may render it impatient, resulting in an effort to balance against China to ensure its security when the window of opportunity is open. Still, Sheen (2013) has predicted that Northeast Asia will eventually face a "demographic peace" in the future, due to the fast aging of the population in the region.…”

Section: Domestic Variables: Conservative Rok Administrations and The Aging Populationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of China-ROK Relations, 1993–2018: An Empirical Analysis Using Event Data

Chung

2020

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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This article seeks to explore the determinants of China-ROK relations during the period 1993–2018, employing event data and statistical analysis. The analysis found that China’s trade dependence on ROK, and vice versa, had a positive effect on China-ROK relations. The relations were also positively affected by China’s economic development. In contrast, the relations were negatively affected as China’s population aged and while conservative administrations governed ROK. The empirical findings of this article provide essential insights, identifying the factors that promote or hinder the development of cooperative China-ROK relations, suggesting guidelines to policymakers on both sides.

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Section: Domestic Variables: Conservative Rok Administrations and The Aging Populationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Determinants of China-ROK Relations, 1993–2018: An Empirical Analysis Using Event Data

Chung

2020

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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“… 25 This holds even using high-end estimates of military spending from SIPRI/IISS. Sheen 2013; State Council Information Office 2012. …”

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Rethinking China's Coercive Capacity: An Examination of PRC Domestic Security Spending, 1992–2012

Greitens¹

2017

The China Quarterly

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Discussions of China's rising domestic security expenditure often present this spending as evidence of the Chinese Communist Party's strong coercive capacity. This article argues that a lack of theoretical clarity about domestic security has resulted in flawed conclusions about these expenditures and their implications for China's coercive capacity. Challenging the conventional wisdom, the article analyses China's domestic security spending from 1992 through 2012 and argues that it is important to consider not only the total amount that China spends but also how it spends these resources and the magnitude of the threats that this expenditure must address. It finds that China's domestic security spending is not historically unprecedented, is not expanding as a proportion of national expenditure, and is not necessarily high (or producing high coercive capacity) when compared to other countries. The article also shows that certain locations struggle more to fund their coercive capacity than others, and that these locations overlap with areas where internal security threats may be particularly acute. The challenges that the coercive apparatus must address have also grown over the same period during which domestic security spending has risen. Finally, attempts to improve the political position of China's coercive agents cannot be equated with improvements in their capacity to manage Chinese society. Cumulatively, this reassessment provides more evidence of the limitations on China's coercive capacity than of its strength.

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“…El fenómeno que ya soportan algunos países europeos, Corea y Japón, entre otros, se extenderá también a Rusia. Los trastornos económicos y sociales es probable que estén acompañados de recortes en sus programas de defensa (Sheen, 2013).…”

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Japón en la geopolítica del siglo XXI

García

2015

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En 1853, Japón fue forzado a salir de su aislamiento feudal y a entroncarse en la red comercial mundial. Su apertura no significó sumisión a los poderes externos, sino la inmersión en la pugna imperialista, de la que saldría derrotado en 1945. Empero, su postración fue pasajera, dado que la nueva contienda de posguerra lo convirtió en aliado incondicional de la misma potencia que con dos bombas atómicas acababa de cercenarle las ambiciones militaristas. El acuerdo estratégico con Estados Unidos se sostuvo incólume aun después de terminada la Guerra Fría. Más aún, la pugna verbal y el despliegue de fuerza en el archipiélago Senkaku/ Diaoyutai, en 2012, facilitó el retorno al poder del ala política más afín al dictado de Washington y a su plan de seguridad en el Pacífico. Hoy en día, el enfrentamiento en el noreste asiático presenta al bloque estadounidensenipo- coreano, por un lado, y al sino-rusonorcoreano, por otro, en una bifurcación que debe ser vista como un nuevo esquema bipolar que garantizará por un tiempo el equilibrio estratégico regional. Es de esperar, sin embargo, progresivas alteraciones en la correlación de fuerzas tanto en esa sección asiática como en el resto del mundo, debido al creciente poder económico, político y militar chino, con impacto sobre los acuerdos geopolíticos vigentes, incluido el nipo-estadounidense.

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Northeast Asia’s Aging Population and Regional Security

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The Determinants of China-ROK Relations, 1993–2018: An Empirical Analysis Using Event Data

The Determinants of China-ROK Relations, 1993–2018: An Empirical Analysis Using Event Data

Rethinking China's Coercive Capacity: An Examination of PRC Domestic Security Spending, 1992–2012

Japón en la geopolítica del siglo XXI

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