Norwegian internet voting protocol revisited: ballot box and receipt generator are allowed to collude

Kardaş, Süleyman; Kiraz, Mehmet Sabır; Bingöl, Muhammed Ali; Birinci, Fatih

doi:10.1002/sec.1678

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The list of Internet voters is not public "until voting is complete on election day" 11 . Alike with paper ballots, "the electronic ballot box containing votes cast via the internet shall also be sealed" 12 .…”

Section: Security and Secrecy Of The Vote And Integrity Of The Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To do so, the voter must download an application available on the Åland e-Government website and then verify the vote using a QR code which has been sent via the i-Voting system as a receipt/proof of casting a vote. This process is quite similar to the ones followed elsewhere in Estonia [15,18], Switzerland [10,16] or Norway [8,11]. Besides, the law prescribes the Government of Åland to "arrange for verification of the votes in the electronic ballot box in order to ensure that they have been registered as intended, that they have been stored as they were registered and that they have been counted as they were stored.…”

Section: Verification Methodsmentioning

confidence: 93%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Nordic Pioneers: facing the first use of Internet Voting in the Åland Islands (Parliamentary Elections 2019)

Krimmer¹,

Dueñas-Cid²,

Krivonosova³

et al. 2019

Preprint

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The Åland Islands will use Internet Voting for the first time for expatriate voters at the next Parliamentary Elections, to be held in October 2019. This electoral modernization is a response to the need detected to introduce changes in order to better integrate expatriate voters and the younger generations into the electoral system, and represents a first step towards fully introducing i-Voting in future elections. This working paper provides a frame-work for the Ålandic electoral system for further analysis of the costs involved to introduce new voting channels following the CoDE Project methodology.

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Section: Security and Secrecy Of The Vote And Integrity Of The Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Verification Methodsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Nordic Pioneers: facing the first use of Internet Voting in the Åland Islands (Parliamentary Elections 2019)

Krimmer¹,

Dueñas-Cid²,

Krivonosova³

et al. 2019

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In response to this, the voter should send their vote anonymously along with the signed token as a proof of eligibility. An alternative approach is to use homomorphic encryption [9]. In this approach, the voter encrypts their vote.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

PVPBC: Privacy and Verifiability Preserving E-Voting Based on Permissioned Blockchain

2023

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Privacy and verifiability are crucial security requirements in e-voting systems and combining them is considered to be a challenge given that they seem to be contradictory. On one hand, privacy means that cast votes cannot be traced to the corresponding voters. On the other hand, linkability of voters and their votes is a requirement of verifiability which has the consequence that a voter is able to check their vote in the election result. These two contradictory features can be addressed by adopting privacy-preserving cryptographic primitives, which at the same time as achieving privacy, achieve verifiability. Many end-to-end schemes that support verifiability and privacy have the need for some voter action. This makes ballot casting more complex for voters. We propose the PVPBC voting system, which is an e-voting system that preserves privacy and verifiability without affecting voter usability. The PVPBC voting system uses an effective and distributed method of authorization, which is based on revocable anonymity, by making use of a permissioned distributed ledger and smart contract. In addition, the underlying PVPBC voting system satisfies election verifiability using the Selene voting scheme. The Selene protocol is a verifiable e-voting protocol. It publishes votes in plaintext accompanied by tracking numbers. This enables voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system. Numerical experiments support the claim that PVPBC scales well as a function of the number of voters and candidates. In particular, PVPBC’s authorization time increases linearly as a function of the population size. The average latency associated with accessing the system also increases linearly with the voter population size. The latency incurred when a valid authentication transaction is created and sent on the DLT network is 6.275 ms. Empirical results suggest that the cost in GBP for casting and storing an encrypted ballot alongside a tracker commitment is a linear function of the number of candidates, which is an attractive aspect of PVPBC.

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“…In 2013, Zwattendorfer et al [26] proposed a proxy voting scheme that allows a voter to delegate his or her voting power to a proxy who actually casts the ballots for all represented voters. Norway has used an Internet-based voting protocol for some years, and the vote privacy and correctness of this scheme have been demonstrated [27]. In 2016, Kulyk et al [28] proposed a new coercion-resistant proxy voting scheme by extending the coercion-resistant JCJ/Civitas theme, aiming to prevent direct voter coercion, delegation coercion, and proxy coercion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalized Proxy Oblivious Signature and Its Mobile Application

Chiou

2021

Security and Communication Networks

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Oblivious signature ensures users select from the specified candidates. However, users can choose only one candidate. This paper proposes a generalized oblivious signature scheme with proxy function. The scheme can be applied to many applications such as multichoice e-voting or e-lottery. Since there have been many applied research studies on e-voting, in this paper, we decided to apply this scheme to e-lottery, which is fair, secure, efficient, multiselect, and agent-based. In the lottery system, the server cannot cheat after a user makes a choice, and no one even the proxy can get any benefits. The signature scheme along with the lottery system is proved secure in the random oracle model. The lottery system is also implemented on Android smartphones. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work done on a generalized proxy oblivious signature along with a fair and secure multiple-choice e-lottery system.

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Norwegian internet voting protocol revisited: ballot box and receipt generator are allowed to collude

Cited by 4 publications

References 24 publications

Nordic Pioneers: facing the first use of Internet Voting in the Åland Islands (Parliamentary Elections 2019)

Nordic Pioneers: facing the first use of Internet Voting in the Åland Islands (Parliamentary Elections 2019)

PVPBC: Privacy and Verifiability Preserving E-Voting Based on Permissioned Blockchain

Generalized Proxy Oblivious Signature and Its Mobile Application

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