“Not So Much As Place to Lay Our Head...”: Moral Inclusion and Exclusion in the American Civil War Reconstruction

Abstract

A war's end can prompt societal change. This article examines inclusionary justice in the post-war period, when societies have the opportunity to change in ways that include formerly disadvantaged groups within the scope of justice. Using historical material on the Reconstruction after the American Civil War, this theory-generating article examines the post-war inclusionary trajectory for enslaved people who were emancipated as a result of the war. After briefly describing the Civil War, the article discusses four points along an inclusionary/exclusionary continuum of the Reconstruction: self-inclusion, instrumental inclusion, obstructed inclusion, and institutionalized exclusion. The article then looks at after-effects of the Reconstruction at two points in time: the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision and the hardships after Hurricane Katrina in 2006. The article concludes with lessons from the Reconstruction for a psychology of inclusionary justice, including the multidimensionality, difficulty, and urgency of changing the status quo, the importance of including missing voices, and the challenges of studying inclusionary change. It argues that moral inclusion needs to occur in political, legal, economic, and social spheres of society if it is to be sustained.

Insecure Status Relations Shape Preferences for the Content of Intergroup Contact

“…Indeed, because people are more sensitive and responsive to injustices within their group than across group lines, emphasizing commonalities and status differences, a pattern we obtained in previous research (Saguy et al, 2008), could sensitize high-status group members to issues related to group-based injustice (Tyler & Blader, 2003; see also Opotow, 2008).…”

Individual responsibilities and moral inclusion in an age of rights

“…(Bhatia, 2000, pp. 311-312) Moral inclusion/exclusion As many scholars have pointed out (Bandura, 1990;Deutsch, 1985;Opotow, 1990Opotow, , 2008Staub, 1989), our moral values, beliefs, and norms apply to people we include within our scope of justice -defined as the moral community. This community may include different levels of people such as family members, friends, neighbors, compatriots, and so on, until it is referred to every person in the world.…”

“…The process of moral inclusion involves the extension of social justice to groups that had formerly been excluded from the scope of justice, such as groups oppressed by and marginalized from society (Opotow, 1990). As Opotow (2008) pointed out: when we include people in our scope of justice, we see considerations of fairness as applying to them, we see them as entitled to resources, and we are willing to make sacrifices to foster their well-being. When we exclude people from the scope of justice, shared moral rules and norms do not apply.…”

How This Was Possible: Interpreting the Holocaust

“…These studies suggest that that moral exclusion and inclusion are not mutually exclusive, but are end points on a continuous dimension with intermediate points such as "conditional inclusion" (Opotow, 1995). These studies also suggest that moral exclusion and moral inclusion can occur simultaneously in the changing conditions after war so that inclusion can occur in some spheres while exclusion occurs in others (Opotow, 2008a). Finally, these studies suggest that moral exclusion and moral inclusion differ temporally: moral exclusion can gain in scope and intensity quickly, while the institutionalization of moral inclusion can be a longer and more fragile process (Opotow, 2008b).…”