Notes on supermodularity and increasing differences in expected utility

Francetich, Alejandro

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.009

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This implies that our method works verbatim if we replace binarized scoring rules with matching probabilities. In fact, the same is true for other elicitation methods (see Section 4.2).11 Interestingly, a similar condition is used byFrancetich (2013) in his characterization result of supermodular vNM EU functions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 69%

Identification of misreported beliefs

Tsakas¹

2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is well-known that subjective beliefs cannot be identified with traditional choice data unless we impose the strong assumption that preferences are state-independent. This is seen as one of the biggest pitfalls of incentivized belief elicitation. The two common approaches are either to exogenously assume that preferences are state-independent, or to use intractable elicitation mechanisms that require an awful lot of hard-to-get non-traditional choice data. In this paper we use a third approach, introducing a novel methodology that retains the simplicity of standard elicitation mechanisms without imposing the awkward state-independence assumption. The cost is that instead of insisting on full identification of beliefs, we seek identification of misreporting. That is, we elicit beliefs with a standard simple elicitation mechanism, and then by means of a single additional observation we can tell whether the reported beliefs deviate from the actual beliefs, and if so, in which direction they do.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 69%

Identification of misreported beliefs

Tsakas¹

2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This is an analog of Axiom S in Francetich (). If

false(p_{1} - q_{1} false) false(p_{2} - q_{2} false) \geq 0

, the left‐hand side (LHS) and the right‐hand side (RHS) are the same and () holds trivially.…”

Section: Mediator‐assisted Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 86%

The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining

Bastianello

LiCalzi

2019

ECTA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.

show abstract

“…This is named after Axiom S in Francetich (2013). It states that a fifty-fifty lottery between two pairs of acceptance probabilities p and q is weakly inferior to a fifty-fifty lottery between their extremes (under the component-wise ordering).…”

Section: A1 (Regularity)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Target-Based Solutions for Nash Bargaining

LiCalzi

Bastianello

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We revisit the Nash model for two-person bargaining. A mediator knows agents' ordinal preferences over feasible proposals, but has incomplete information about their acceptance thresholds. We provide a behavioural characterisation under which the mediator recommends a proposal that maximises the probability that bargainers strike an agreement. Some major solutions are recovered as special cases; in particular, we offer a straightforward interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution.

show abstract

Notes on supermodularity and increasing differences in expected utility

Cited by 4 publications

References 4 publications

Identification of misreported beliefs

Identification of misreported beliefs

The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining

Target-Based Solutions for Nash Bargaining

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About