Notes on the Pure Theory of Public Finance

Benham, F.

doi:10.2307/2549125

Cited by 22 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…We note the theoretical difficulty which arises for the voluntary exchange theory in the event that some of the members of the community should attempt to benefit from public services without in turn being eager to contribute their share. While recognized as constituting a 'pathological group' (De Marco, [1934], p. 114) and a 'problem' (Benham [1934], p. 454), they are ruled out by the assumption of purely voluntary action. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that all people act in the prescribed 'pathological' manner, the following problem arises: if the total cost of public services is covered by a large number of contributors, a reduction in the contribution of any one contributor will fail to affect notably the total supply of public services -either from the point of view of this contributor or in the eyes of other contributors who join in the consumption of the same indivisible services.…”

Section: Free Riding and Non-exclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Musgrave, Samuelson, and the Crystallization of the Standard Rationale for Public Goods

Desmarais-Tremblay¹

2017

History of Political Economy

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International audienceThis paper provides a narrative of the emergence of the standard textbook definition of public goods. It focuses on Richard A. Musgrave’s contribution in defining public goods as nonrival and nonexcludable—from 1937 to 1973. Although Samuelson’s mathematical definition is generally used in models of public goods, the qualitative understanding of the specificity of pure public goods owes a lot to Musgrave. I argue that the evolution of Musgrave’s writings on public goods reflects his intention to justify his view of the role of the state in providing goods and services to citizens with an argument that would be convincing to the community of U.S. economists in the mid-twentieth century. Musgrave’s definition highlights his lifelong concern for a comprehensive, realistic, and useful normative theory of the public sector

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Section: Free Riding and Non-exclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Musgrave, Samuelson, and the Crystallization of the Standard Rationale for Public Goods

Desmarais-Tremblay¹

2017

History of Political Economy

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“…This approach tries to produce a 'positive' or 'ethically neutral' solution and is associated with the 10 names of Sax (1887: Part I, paras 29-32), Wicksell (1896: Part II) and Lindahl (1919;1924), Einaudi, andBenham (1934). It examines the mode of political agreement necessary to effect public expenditure in terms of economic analysis, apart from the outcome of the decisions of the political sovereign.…”

Section: The 'Positive' or 'Neutral' Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is to be noted that this conclusion holds independently of the assumption of 'equal bargaining strength', which we may define as equal income distribution. Some writers have tried to argue, however, that those who refuse to pay are 'pathological' (Benham 1934), assuming presumably that given equal income distribution, tastes should be similar. Granted that decisions regarding the level of expenditure may not be unanimous, and thus, ultimately compulsion may be necessary to enforce decisions, then the assumption of equal bargaining strength becomes a very special one.…”

Section: The 'Positive' or 'Neutral' Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%