2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) 2020
DOI: 10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00034
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Novel Design of Hardware Trojan: A Generic Approach for Defeating Testability Based Detection

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Cited by 5 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Further, to make the DeTrust benchmarks [13], we perform the modification in 10 Trust-Hub benchmarks by inserting the one flipflop at each gate output of the trigger circuit as suggested by [20]. Similarly, to show the Trojan designed by DeTest [29], we modify the one Trust-Hub benchmark s38417−T 100 by inserting the given logic in this circuit. Finally, [20] also suggests to make always-on-Trojan by removing the trigger part of the Trust-Hub s38417 − T 300 benchmark whose payload is a ring oscillator Trojan.…”
Section: A Dataset Description and Evaluation Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, to make the DeTrust benchmarks [13], we perform the modification in 10 Trust-Hub benchmarks by inserting the one flipflop at each gate output of the trigger circuit as suggested by [20]. Similarly, to show the Trojan designed by DeTest [29], we modify the one Trust-Hub benchmark s38417−T 100 by inserting the given logic in this circuit. Finally, [20] also suggests to make always-on-Trojan by removing the trigger part of the Trust-Hub s38417 − T 300 benchmark whose payload is a ring oscillator Trojan.…”
Section: A Dataset Description and Evaluation Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, the clustering results are fed to the decision-making system, which identifies the circuits as Trojan-free/inserted based on the majority voting scheme. Recently, DeTest [29] defeated SCOAP based techniques by designing new Trojans, which decreases the SCOAP values of HT nets up to 10%. Moreover, structural/SCOAP featuresbased techniques fail to detect either always-on-Trojans or low SCOAP HT nets.…”
Section: Literature Review: Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, to make the DeTrust benchmarks [13], we perform the modification in 10 Trust-Hub benchmarks by inserting the one flipflop at each gate output of the trigger circuit as suggested by [20]. Similarly, to show the Trojan designed by DeTest [29], we modify the one Trust-Hub benchmark s38417−T 100 by inserting the given logic in this circuit. Finally, [20] also suggests to make always-on-Trojan by removing the trigger part of the Trust-Hub s38417 − T 300 benchmark whose payload is a ring oscillator Trojan.…”
Section: A Dataset Description and Evaluation Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unsupervised strategies, in general, adopt testability measurebased features targeting Trojans that have low controllability and low observability [30]. Such methods can be circumvented by redesigning the Trojans to satisfy the conditions of a normal circuit, as mentioned in [21]. Furthermore, strategies that adopt structural features underperform in true positive rate (TPR) due to the limited Trojan space learned in the training phase, causing poor generalization capability.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, unsupervised strategies use functional features, targeting Trojans with low controllability and transition probability pertaining to their stealthy nature. Such methods can be evaded by redesigning Trojans to satisfy the conditions of a normal circuit [21]. Moreover, the methods that depend on structural features underperform in true positive rate (TPR) due to the limited Trojan space exploration in the training phase.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%