Nuclear deterrence and the logic of deliberative mindreading

Bringsjord, Selmer; Govindarajulu, Naveen Sundar; Ellis, Simon; Mccarty, Evan; Licato, John

doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.08.001

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…8 In short, what the creative machine does is perform an action that, relative to the knowledge, beliefs, desires, and expectations of the agents composing its audience, is a surprise. 9 We refer to this generic, underlying form of creativity as theory-of-mind-creativity. Our terminology reflects that for one agent to have a "theory of mind" of another agent is for the first agent to have beliefs (etc.)…”

Section: Theory-of-mind-creativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?

Bringsjord

Govindarajulu

2018

Foundations of Trusted Autonomy

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Section: Theory-of-mind-creativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?

Bringsjord

Govindarajulu

2018

Foundations of Trusted Autonomy

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“…For instance, one might pursue a proof-theoretic semantics (see e.g. Bringsjord, Govindarajulu, Ellis, McCarty & Licato 2014), but that isn't done by Anderson (1976).…”

Section: The "Maybe" Catgory Act-r and The Expressivity Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contemporary Craft of Creating Characters Meets Today's Cognitive Architectures

Licato

Bringsjord

Bringsjord³

2016

Integrating Cognitive Architectures Into Virtual Character Design

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version of 0121161500NY * We are indebted to two anonymous referees, and editor Jeremy Turner, for insightful suggestions and objections. Any remaining deficiencies are due to our own failings. AbstractWe herein investigate the following question:(Q3) What does the contemporary craft of character design (by human authors), which is beyond the reach of foreseeable AI, and which isn't powered by any stunning, speculative, AI-infused technology (immersive or otherwise), but is instead aided by triedand-true "AI-less" software tools and immemorial techniques that are still routinely taught today, imply with respect to today's computational cognitive architectures?Because this is a large question, we narrow its scope so as to be able to productively consider it in the space of but the present chapter. Our narrowing is accomplished by making three moves. First, we anchor the discussion to a simple, single story (Double-Minded Man) populated by only a pair of characters, and crafted in a particular "AI-less" software system taught and used by scriptwriters today. Second, we focus specifically on the expressivity of a cognitive architecture, in light, specifically, of two expressivity challenges that arise from considering Double-Minded Man and its characters. And third, we partition cognitive architectures, with respect to these challenges, into three categories. The first category is composed of those architectures that appear to have no chance of meeting the challenges; the second, of those that perhaps meet the challenges; and the third, of those that clearly meet the challenges. As shall be seen, the cognitive architecture ACT-R falls into the second category, and CLARION falls into the third. Encapsulating, then, here's the core of our answer to (Q3):(AQ3) While ACT-R and cognitive architectures that have its level of expresivity or less are perhaps able to support cognitive models of characters in narrative, CLARION certainly has a level of expressivity sufficient to capture such characters. While we know of no other cognitive architecture that has this high level of expressivity, any architecture with this level of expressivity would at least be a candidate for the robust modeling implied by contemporary story and character design.

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“…Some DCEC * formulae (not shown here) also connect knowledge, belief, desire, perception, and communication. For a full discussion, see [20]. At RO-MAN 2015, demonstration of success on the mirror test will be provided.…”

Section: Disclaimer: Tests and Structure Onlymentioning

confidence: 99%

Real robots that pass human tests of self-consciousness

Bringsjord

Licato

Govindarajulu

et al. 2015

2015 24th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN)

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Self-consciousness would seem to be a sine qua non for moral competence in a social world. You and we are morally competent in no small part because you know what you ought to do, and we know what we ought to do. A mouse, in contrast, cannot say to itself: "I ought to share this cheese, even if my brother refuses to do so." But can robots be self-conscious? Approaching this question from the standpoint of so-called Psychometric AI, we note that prior work by Govindarajulu and Bringsjord led to the engineering of a robot (Cogito) able to provably pass the famous mirror test of self-consciousness. But a more challenging test for robot self-consciousness has been provided by Floridi; this test is an ingenious and much-harder variant of the well-known-in-AI wise-man puzzle: Each of three robots is given one pill from a group of five, three of which are innocuous, but two of which, when taken, immediately render the recipient dumb. In point of fact, two robots (R1 and R2) are given potent pills, but R3 receives one of the three placebos. The human tester says: "Which pill did you receive? No answer is correct unless accompanied by a proof!" Given a formal regimentation of this test previously formulated by Bringsjord, it can be proved that, in theory, a future robot represented by R3 can answer provably correctly (which for plausible reasons, explained by Floridi, entails that R3 has satisfied some of the structural requirements for self-consciousness). In this paper we explain and demonstrate the engineering that now makes this theoretical possibility actual, both in the simulator known as 'PAGI World' (used for testing AIs), and in real (= physical) robots interacting with a human tester. These demonstrations involve scenarios that demand the passing of Floridi's test for self-consciousness, where for us, passing such a test is required for an agent to be regarded morally competent. 1 On the rationale for the mere focus on the structural aspects of self-consciousness, see §II. For excellent work that is at once structural/computational, and, unlike that displayed in the present paper, informed by cognitive neuro/science, see [3].

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Nuclear deterrence and the logic of deliberative mindreading

Cited by 9 publications

References 28 publications

Are Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?

Are Autonomous-and-Creative Machines Intrinsically Untrustworthy?

The Contemporary Craft of Creating Characters Meets Today's Cognitive Architectures

Real robots that pass human tests of self-consciousness

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