Nuclear Power Plants and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets

Chapin, Douglas M.; Cohen, Karl; Davis, W. Kenneth; Kintner, E.E.; Koch, L.J.; Landis, J.W.; Levenson, M.; Mandil, I. Harry; Pate, Zack T.; Rockwell, Theodore; Schriesheim, Alan; Simpson, John; Squire, Alexander; Starr, Chauncey; Stone, Henry E.; Taylor, John J.; Todreas, Neil E.; Wolfe, Bertram D.; Zebroski, E.L.

doi:10.1126/science.1077855

Cited by 24 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In both cases, the critical factor is the ability of a turbine shaft to penetrate the multiple layers of containment that surround the reactor core. Although some questions remain regarding the effects of a deliberate aircraft attack on a nuclear power plant, these events would not likely present more severe stresses on reactor containment systems than those originally used as the design basis (147)(148)(149)(150). Higher impact speeds tend to reduce the probability that a large aircraft could be flown into a specific point on a power plant, reducing the risk somewhat (151).…”

Section: Reactorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Farrell

Zerriffi

Dowlatabadi

2004

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.

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Concerns about safeguarding key infrastructures (such as energy, communications, banking, and roads) from deliberate attack are long-standing, but since the end to the cold war, emphasis has turned to the possible impacts of terrorism. Activities to address these concerns are sometimes called critical infrastructure protection (CIP), a concept that is somewhat different from the one of "energy security," which focuses on politically and economically motivated supply interruptions. Different elements of the energy infrastructure are characterized by distinct vulnerabilities. Breaches of security in nuclear plants can lead to large-scale environmental disasters-but the infrastructure is concentrated and relatively easy to guard. Oil and gas production, transportation, and refining infrastructures are often spatially concentrated, and disruptions can lead to shortages if supply is not restored before stockpiles are exhausted. Traditional electricity infrastructures suffer from the need for system-wide integrity to ensure supply reliability, having critical facilities spatially concentrated (substations), and insignificant storage capacity for emergency supply. This review discusses how energy infrastructure and security are related, how this relationship differs from traditional energy security concepts, and what it may mean for private and policy decisions. Key concepts include redundancy, diversity, resilience, storage, decentralization, and interdependence. The concept of CIP is still relatively new and is likely to evolve over time, possibly away from a "guards, gates, and guns" defensive approach and toward a design approach that yields systems that are inherently harder to successfully attack. Such survivable systems may feature distributed intelligence, control, and operations.

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Section: Reactorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Farrell

Zerriffi

Dowlatabadi

2004

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.

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“…Recent treatments of Homeland Security research concentrate on how to spend billions to protect sensitive installations from attack (14,15). But this last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the multitude of vulnerable and likely targets (including discotheques, restaurants, and malls), the abundance of would-be attackers (needing little supervision once embarked on a mission), the relatively low costs of attack (hardware store ingredients, no escape needs), the difficulty of detection (little use of electronics), and the unlikelihood that attackers would divulge sensitive information (being unaware of connections beyond their operational cells).…”

Section: Dubious Public Perceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mishandling suicide terrorism

Atran

2004

The Washington Quarterly

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“…However, evidence from kinetic tests in the United States indicates that plunging jet aircraft into nuclear installations will not cause a reactor meltdown nor inflict catastrophic damage on nuclear facilities (see Chapin 2002;and Nuclear Energy Institute 2002). An extensive study of reactor security published by the US Government Accountability Office has concluded that, since 9/11, substantial advancements have been achieved across a broad spectrum of conceivable security scenarios involving American nuclear facilities (US NRC 2006).…”

Section: Would a Domestic Nuclear Industry Be Vulnerable To Terrorism?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation

Manning¹,

O’Neil²

2007

Australian Journal of Political Science

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The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in antinuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the 'immoral' nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.

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Nuclear Power Plants and Their Fuel as Terrorist Targets

Cited by 24 publications

References 6 publications

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Energy Infrastructure and Security

Mishandling suicide terrorism

Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation

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