Objective Becoming: In Search of A-ness

Leininger, Lisa

doi:10.1093/analys/anx155

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Assuming you think that the former can exist in the absence of the latter. While Savitt (2002), Deng (2013a;2013b; and Leininger (2018; in some sense all identify temporal passage with the presence of succession (what for Deng and Savitt are really just B-relations), Leininger (2021) takes the presence of succession to be intimately connected with causality (and the light-cone structure), and it may be that many of these other authors are reductionists about B-relations, so that they take these relations to be reducible to facts about causation (Mellor 1998;Le Poidevin 1991) or the global entropic gradient (Albert 2000) rather than being primitive (Maudlin 2007;Oaklander 2012;Tegtmeier 1996; and hence able to come apart from these other asymmetries.…”

Section: Background To the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World

Everett,

Latham,

Miller

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk concept of temporal passage can be satisfied in our world if it is non-dynamical, and, if it can, what sort of thing in our world satisfies that concept. In particular, we focus on the question of whether that concept (if satisfied) is satisfied by something mind-dependent or something mind-independent. In other words, we ask, is temporal passage something that is at least partially in the mind, or is it entirely external to the mind? We find, contrary to what is often assumed by dynamists and non-dynamists alike, that the folk concept of temporal passage is satisfied in our world conditional on it being non-dynamical, and that the concept is satisfied by something mind-independent. This provides further ammunition for recent deflationary accounts of temporal passage that attempt to locate passage somewhere in our non-dynamical world.

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Section: Background To the Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7. See Savitt (2002), Deng (2013a;2013b;, Leininger (2018;, Ismael (2017), Mozersky (2015), Maudlin (2007), Dieks (2006), Oaklander (2015), Fazekas (2016), Harrington (2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World

Everett,

Latham,

Miller

2023

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…For defenses of eternalism (in its B-theoretic guise) see LePoidevin (1991);Price (1996);Mellor (1998);Savitt (2002);Maudlin (2007);Farr (2012Farr ( , 2020;Ismael (2012Ismael ( , 2017;Oaklander (2012);Bardon (2013);(2013a, 2013b;Leininger (2018Leininger ( , 2021.6 For discussion of location and location relations, seeParsons (2007Parsons ( , 2008 andEagle (2010aEagle ( , 2010b.…”

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confidence: 99%

Persistence

Miller

2022

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Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.

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“…25 25 Notice also that the idea of considering a cross‐temporal relation as primitively dynamic has been explored also within B‐theoretic framework. See, on this, Maudlin (2007) (who Lipman quotes) but also Deng (2010) and Leininger (2018). …”

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confidence: 99%

The Invisible Thin Red Line

Torrengo

Iaquinto

2020

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine's non‐standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A‐theoretic branching time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world.

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Objective Becoming: In Search of A-ness

Cited by 5 publications

References 6 publications

Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World

Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World

Persistence

The Invisible Thin Red Line

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