“…While classifying animal behavior as intentional is conceptually intricate (Heyes and Dickinson, 1990), in both the natural and social sciences, animals' intentional agency is increasingly being substantiated (De Waal, 1996;Bekoff, 2007;Lestel, 2011;Belgrad and Griffen, 2016;Brakel, 2016). Since von Uexküll's (1909) work has suggested how even allegedly simple organisms entertain their respective forms of intentions when acting upon their umwelten, it is now widely accepted that minds of animals as different as chimpanzees (Call and Tomasello, 2008), crows (Emery, 2004), wild boars (Masilkova et al, 2021), and even fish (Brown, 2015) and insects (Prete, 2004) are richly populated by intentions and motives: by emotions responding to given states, by thoughts about these states, by desires for certain further states, by orientations toward attaining these states, and by behavioral attempts to realize them. The degree to which animals are conscious of their intentional states is hardly possible to establish empirically (Shettleworth, 2001(Shettleworth, , 2009), yet precursors of human forms of consciousness and sense of self arguably are present in all animals (Fogassi et al, 2005;De Waal and Ferrari, 2010;Low, 2012;Gupta and Sinha, 2014;Reber, 2016;Rowlands, 2016).…”