Observed Punishment Spillover Effects: A Laboratory Investigation of Behavior in a Social Dilemma

Abstract

Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond one's immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well understood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover effects in a controlled lab setting using a standard social dilemma: the voluntary contributions mechanism. We find that spillovers occur when others observe punishment outside their own social dilemma. However, the direction of the spillover effect depends crucially on personal punishment history and whether one is personally exempt from punishment or not.

Regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability

“…2 By contrast, Noussair and Tucker (2007) find that revealing all contribution decisions reduces contributions as compared to revealing none in a repeated game. Dickinson et al (2015) examine if public 1 Coricelli et al (2014) find that public display of identity only reduces cheating in situations where individuals can be forgiven and reintegrated in the group. In the absence of this option individuals do not change behavior as they do not experience more shame with each subsequent cheating decision.…”

Fraud Deterrence Institutions Reduce Intrinsic Honesty

“…However, inspections might still inform people on the descriptive norm in the field (Sliwka, 2007;Dickinson et al, 2015). If ticket inspectors signal the prevalence of rule violations, after an inspection people may revise downward their perception of the descriptive norm in the society.…”

“…enforcement of the deterrence institution may affect compliers' beliefs about the spread of norm violation in society. Observing many violators being punished may reveal that misconduct is socially widespread and has become the norm, and lead compliers to behave accordingly (Keizer et al, 2008;Dickinson et al, 2015).…”

Sleepy Punishers Are Harsh Punishers

“…Our finding suggests that a nationwide policy can unexpectedly undermine the justice system. Previous scholars have proposed that third-party punishment enables large-scale cooperation beyond direct-exchange relationships because individuals expect to be caught if they violate the norm of reciprocity (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Dickinson, Dutcher, & Rodet, 2015; Henrich et al., 2006). However, questioning fairness in third-party punishment can erode its deterrent and retributive functions.…”