Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game

Grafenhofer, Dominik; Kuhle, Wolfgang

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2702292

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Taking this perspective, we contribute to the effort aimed at enriching the global games information structure. Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), Steiner and Steward (2011) Kuhle (2016), Grafenhofer and Kuhle (2016), Bergemann and Morris (2015), Binmore and Samuelson (2001) have recently emphasized the role of heterogenous priors, strategic information revelation and learning, environments where agents receive signals over each others' information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observing Actions in Global Games

Grafenhofer¹,

Kuhle²

2021

Preprint

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We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoffs, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains in a manner similar to a global games setting. On the contrary, if private information over actions (and thus over the game's payoff coefficient) is precise, agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria. We argue that our results apply to phenomena such as bank-runs, currency crises, recessions, or riots and revolutions, where agents monitor each other closely.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observing Actions in Global Games

Grafenhofer¹,

Kuhle²

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), Steiner and Steward (2011), Kuhle (2016), Grafenhofer and Kuhle (2016), Bergemann and Morris (2015), Binmore and Samuelson (2001), Angeletos et al (2007), Mathevet (2012), Frankel (2012 add heterogenous priors, multidimensional signal structures, applications to mechanism design and dynamic information revelation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Observing Actions in Bayesian Games

Grafenhofer,

Kuhle

2019

Preprint

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We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains like in a standard global games setting. The current model, with its flexible information structure, can thus be used to study phenomena such as bank-runs, currency crises, recessions, riots, and revolutions, where agents rely on information over each others' actions.

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Observing Each Other's Observations in a Bayesian Coordination Game

Cited by 2 publications

References 15 publications

Observing Actions in Global Games

Observing Actions in Global Games

Observing Actions in Bayesian Games

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