2023
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104856
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Occupy government: Democracy and the dynamics of personnel decisions and public finances

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1

Citation Types

0
4
0
3

Year Published

2023
2023
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 73 publications
0
4
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…For instance, light-touch policy interventions, such as residency requirements stipulating that applicants must reside in the district to which they are applying, may help undermine the dynamics of in-group-out-group competition that give rise to the reported effects. To be clear, the argument presented here does not disputeand is not able to evaluate-the consensus that the merit-based recruitment of civil servants leads to better measures of service delivery, particularly as compared with countries where patronage is rampant (Barbosa and Ferreira 2019;Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso 2020). Instead, my intention is to unearth the costs at which these gains in performance might come in terms of unanticipated attitudinal shifts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…For instance, light-touch policy interventions, such as residency requirements stipulating that applicants must reside in the district to which they are applying, may help undermine the dynamics of in-group-out-group competition that give rise to the reported effects. To be clear, the argument presented here does not disputeand is not able to evaluate-the consensus that the merit-based recruitment of civil servants leads to better measures of service delivery, particularly as compared with countries where patronage is rampant (Barbosa and Ferreira 2019;Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso 2020). Instead, my intention is to unearth the costs at which these gains in performance might come in terms of unanticipated attitudinal shifts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…Many studies have found that party membership can assure higher incomes, superior well-being ( Lu et al, 2022 ; Zhang et al, 2020 ), and other potential benefits ( Yan, 2019 ; Yang & Pamala, 2021 ). Such advantages are collectively labeled “party membership premiums.” Most existing studies have found that party membership premiums could accrue from special positions ( Barbosa & Ferreira, 2023 ), strong working abilities ( Guo & Sun, 2019 ; Li et al, 2007 ), high educational levels ( Ma & Iwasaki, 2021 ; Markussen & Ngo, 2019 ), extensive social networks ( Ivlevs & Hinks, 2018 ; Westfall et al, 2017 ), and rent-seeking ( Chen, 2008 ). Party members can transform their political positions into real returns through such means.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous research has documented different real‐world costs due to turnover of bureaucrats ( Iyer and Mani ( 2011 ), Akhtari, Moreira, and Trucco ( 2020 )). There is also evidence on how political turnover affects employment outcomes within and selection into the bureaucracy ( Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso ( 2020 ), Barbosa and Ferreira ( 2019 ), Brassiolo, Estrada, and Fajardo ( 2020 ), Fiva, Geys, Heggedal, and Sørensen ( 2021 ), Xu ( 2018 )). It is important to note, however, that extant work focuses on developing countries, where the bureaucracy may be more suspectible to political interference, even if it is nominally insulated.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%